THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

The Lambeth Conference.

The seventh Lambeth Conference is in session. Almost as many bishops will be present at it as were present at the first great General Council of the Christian Church. The Lambeth Conference is not held by express permission of our Gracious King, and he will not address it after the example of Constantine the Great at Nicaea. We have grown less Erastian, if not more Christian, since those ancient days, when not a few of the bishops who attended Nicaea bore on their bodies the marks of their sufferings from pagan persecution.

Some there are who view with trembling the possible results of the present Lambeth Conference. We view them with hope. The British race—and our Lambeth Fathers are with few exceptions of that race—is blessed with a high degree of political sagacity, as Professor Dibelius has emphasized in his recent book *England*. The present Conference is not likely to go back on the spirit of enlightened and progressive comprehensiveness which marked the great declarations of its immediate predecessor in 1920. Under the leadership of the Primates and Metropolitans, inspired by the statesmanlike utterances of Dr. Headlam's recent book on *Christian Unity*,* we may reasonably hope that the Conference will take the right turning on the South India issue. After all the desire for union in South India is primarily an Indian question. Those who are opposed to the exercise of imperialism by the State ought to be at least as strongly opposed to the exercise of imperialism by the Church.

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The people on the spot should be the best judges of what is needed for the welfare and influence of the Christian Church in South India. It is intolerable that a patiently and prayerfully wrought-out scheme of reunion—the product of years of work and of much skilful compromise, should be prejudiced by its failure to secure the approbation of an assembly whose immediate predecessors put forth that remarkably courageous and comprehensive 'Appeal to All Christian People.'

As regards Home-reunion, there is no doubt that the time is more than ripe for promoting unity by acts of Christian fellowship which are primarily such. Freedom to do this should be granted when the local clergy and people desire to unite in the Holy Communion with their non-Anglican brethren. In this matter we are sure that the great majority of Modernist Churchmen are in full sympathy with the resolution passed at the recent Oxford Conference of Evangelical Churchmen:

> 'The Conference, believing that inasmuch as the worship of the one Lord is incomplete unless Christians are able to share the fellowship which they have with Him at the Lord's Table, re-affirms the conviction that inter-communion is one of the most effective means for promoting, and not only consummating, organic union between the Anglican and the Non-Episcopal Churches. The Conference respectfully urges on the Lambeth Conference the necessity of actively furthering this purpose. It considers that the time has now come for full liberty to be granted to Anglican Churchmen to enjoy this privilege.'

There are many other matters of importance to come before the Conference, but none equal in importance to the achievement of relations of full Christian fellowship with our fellow-Christians of other communions who desire it.

It is objected against gatherings of men of the same trade, be they miners or schoolmasters, civil servants or landholders, that it deepens their sense of class-consciousness to the detriment of the public welfare. We do not anticipate any strengthening of episcopal class consciousness as the result of Lambeth. Bishops soon discover in such assemblies that there are bishops and bishops, and that the grace of episcopacy is not able to transform weak and erring mortals into infallible and impeccable popes, although the humble effort to do one's duty as a bishop may do something to develop one's moral strength and practical wisdom.

To those who have never before visited England the venerable historic shrines of English religion will prove a wonder

and delight—a testimony to the deep religious devotion of the English race. To those who have originally gone forth from these shores to serve the English Church beyond the seas the return to England will be 'a gracious interview of friends so long divided'—a *reintegratio amoris amantium.*

We may have seemed to stress unduly the English character of the Anglican Communion. For good or ill this is the fact. The most English institution in U.S.A. is the Protestant Episcopal Church. Travel the whole world over and one never encounters anything so English as the English Church and its clergy. Yet to-day it is not nationalist or imperialist. Its English character is found in its loyalty to the principles of English civilization: its admiration for the highest ideals of English culture, and this in no insular or exclusive fashion. Its bishops of whatever race are English in this respect, and yet not loyal to English ideals in such a way as to make them less loyal to their own people and their needs.

Although one of the great Cappadocian Fathers had little good to say of assemblies of bishops in the era of the Great Councils, we are sure that the Lambeth Conference will prove for the assembled bishops an occasion of enlargement of vision and of mental and moral inspiration.

The Solemn Remonstrance.

The Solemn Remonstrance recently addressed to the English Bishops by some eleven hundred Anglo-Catholics is one of those spectacular advertizing efforts in which the organizers of the party excel. With documents of this sort the judicious reader turns first to the signatures. Here he receives a jar, for there are none. We have instead the assurances of certain distinguished Anglo-Catholic laymen that the signatures exist. They have counted the signatures, but we, who desire to weigh them, are left helpless.

When we turn to the document itself we find that it is a demand for 'a fair deal' from the English episcopate. The phrase 'a fair deal,' combined with the tone of effrontery which stamps the composition would certainly have shocked John Keble, Canon Liddon, Dean Church, and the older leaders of the movement. Anglo-Catholicism, as represented by the remonstrants, has fallen upon evil days. Spurned by the Romanists,

deserted by its more cultured and scholarly elements, it seems to be making desperate and futile efforts to retrieve a cause which it has been instrumental in ruining.

There is a place, an honoured place in the English Church, for a reasonable, enlightened, and loyal Anglo-Catholicism. This we have always recognized and asserted, and none have put the case better for it than the late Dean Rashdall in *Christus in Ecclesia*. But an Anglo-Catholicism which is obscurantist, disloyal, fanatically intolerant, and proclaims itself as such, has signed its own death-warrant. It may tell the bishops: 'Your present policy is suicidal!' It is not, however, the bishops, but these extremists, upon whom History will deliver the verdict of *felo de se*. The comprehensiveness of the Church of England can embrace all except the disloyal, and tolerate all except the intolerant. The Modernists, whom the Solemn Remonstrance assails, are at least loyal to their communion and would do nothing to limit its traditional comprehensiveness.

The assertion of these Anglo-Catholic extremists: 'We have come to the limit of endurance,' is the cry of spoilt children who, having been given far more than is good for them, fulminate against their indulgent parents. The bishops have given all they can give: even if they would, they cannot give more. Those who make this demand do not seem to realize how much they have received from the bishops, and how grievously the vast bulk of the English laity resents the episcopal indulgence.

The Bridge Church and the Bridgemen.

The description of the Church of England as the Bridge Church, which was first coined at the Lausanne Conference, is one that has received the *imprimatur* of Bishop Gore and is becoming increasingly popular in Church circles. The phrase has the great advantage for the ecclesiastical mind of being ambiguous. The functions of a bridge may be regarded in two different ways. In the Latin idiom the function of a bridge is to join the banks of a river. Hence the Church of England may be conceived of as uniting the great Reformed and Unreformed communions both in her teaching and practice. On the other hand, a bridge may be thought of as the means by which one travels from one side of a river to the other. In this sense the Church of England is conceived of as the means by which the spiritual

pilgrim passes from Protestantism to Romanism. Bishop Gore regards the Church of England as a Bridge Church in the former sense, Sir James Marchant as a Bridge Church in the latter sense. Hence he writes in the April *Dublin Review* :

> 'To some Anglicans, and their numbers increase, the Canterbury bridge has borne them across disturbed waters to secure safety and peace at the last in the holy city of their souls. And their gratitude to her for their passage is unstinted.'

Reading his article, 'The Spiritual Pilgrim,' from which these words are cited, we could not but ask : Is it possible that Sir James Marchant himself has secured safety and peace by such a transit? If he has not, it is difficult to understand his commendation of the conversion of Father Vernon and his annoyance with Mr. Milner White and Mr. Wilfred Knox who have ventured to criticize Father Vernon's reasons for his conversion. Of Fr. Vernon's recent experience Sir James writes :

> 'As the poverty-stricken life of Protestantism recedes he will grow richer in the fuller life of Catholicism . . . "If ever," says Father Vernon, "an Anglo-Catholic is to come into close personal touch with the inner life of the Catholic Church, something must happen to him, some 'tremendous jolt,' so that he can see the Catholic Church as she really is." It is to be hoped that such a jolt comes quickly to Father Vernon's critics.'

To our editor of collected essays on Reunion, Reunion has plainly come at last to mean Rome, but happily no 'tremendous jolt' was required to effect the transit. It came about as the result of viewing the Church of England as the Bridge Church, whilst he thought of Rome as 'the eternal city.' Those, who think of the Church of England as 'our Zion,' or even as 'our Sparta,' are under no such temptation to make an Italian pilgrimage to behold 'the ghost of the Roman Empire sitting crowned on the grave thereof.' But the bridge idea in ecclesiasticism abounds with complications, for is not the Pope himself the supreme bridge-builder — the *Pontifex maximus* of Roman Imperialism in Christendom? For the Pope took the title over from the Roman Emperor as he took over the other imperial *insignia*. But what is the Pope's bridge? Is it the old *pont d'Avignon, où nous dansons toujours à la ronde*, or is it the *Ponte Sisto* or one of its companion bridges which join the Vatican City to Imperial Rome? Readers of Canon Streeter, taking a more imaginative view, might regard the bridge as 'the Petrine compromise' which united the primitive Christian

Churches of St. Paul and St. James; others as the Latin ecclesiastical bridge by which the culture of the Roman Empire passed over into the life of the barbarian conquerors of Europe. These are all bridges of the past. The Popes and their servants are always bridge-building, and every bridge they build has but one purpose, it is intended to facilitate the transit to Rome. Hence though Sir James Marchant may have left the Bridge Church, it is to become a servant of the great bridge-builder. He will still be on the bridge, not now as a pilgrim, but as a workman—a most appropriate transition, for they who use the bridge ought to help to build it.

A Swedish Modernist Movement.

A religious movement of some significance has recently originated in Sweden within the Swedish Church. An association has been formed under the title, *The Religious Society of Sweden.* Whilst its aim is to preserve the religious outlook of the Swedish nation, it proposes to do this by going back to the *fons et origo* of the Christian Religion, the religion of Jesus Christ Himself. It is His teaching of the Fatherhood of God and the Kingdom of God which is authoritative for this new Society. But whilst recognizing this, the new Society does not bind its members to any special confessional formulae, but respects their personal convictions, and emphasizes the justice and necessity of freedom of research in theology as in any other sphere of intellectual investigation, and liberty of faith and conscience in church, and school, and society. It believes that its efforts must lead to a great simplification of Christian dogma and Christian worship. Nevertheless the Society is far from being limited in its activities and sympathies to theological and liturgical matters. It is concerned also with social, eugenic, and international problems. It desires to be both Christian and humanist, and has no intention of being captured by an arid and uninviting Puritanism. It recognizes the relation between the Christian Religion and culture. (The word in Swedish as in German is wider than our English word, and perhaps is better represented by civilization.) Its motto is plainly, 'Seek first the Kingdom of God and its righteousness, and all things necessary for this life shall be added unto you'—and how many things they are only a progressive experience can realize.

A movement of this kind is bound to be assailed from many quarters. It will be said that it is so vague and undefined in its programme that it has no chance of becoming popular or of securing a strong moral and spiritual corporate life. Since Professor Linderholm of Uppsala University is its founder and president, it must be intellectualist. Its magazine is entitled *Religion och Kultur*, therefore it is not evangelical but *dilettante*. It seeks to go back to the Fatherhood of God and the moral and spiritual teaching of Jesus Christ: this means Unitarianism. It dares to propose to itself to reform the worship and doctrine of a flourishing Reformed National Church: this is surely presumptuous and a little humorous. We, who are English Modernists, know something of such charges. It is important for all would-be Church reformers, while they strive to cultivate fellowship with God and fellowship with men, to cultivate also patience and a sense of humour, and to remember the saying of the Rabbis:

> 'It is not for you to finish the work, and it is not for you to cease from it, and the reward of the righteous is in the age to come.'

ADOLF VON HARNACK

ON June 10 in the University Hospital at Heidelberg, at the age of seventy-nine, there passed away the *doyen* of German theologians. In Adolf von Harnack were embodied the best elements of his epoch, the moral earnestness of Kant, the religious feeling of Schleiermacher, the uncompromising historical realism of Ritschl.

Harnack was born at Dorpat in 1851. He spent his student days at Leipzig, and in 1879 was appointed Professor of Church History in Giessen. In 1886 he removed to Marburg and in 1889 to Berlin. He devoted himself to research into the sources of early Church history, and established his reputation as a scholar of the first rank by his work on the text of the *Apostolic Fathers* published in collaboration with O. von Gebhardt and T. Zahn, 1875-77. He is best known to English readers through *The History of Dogma* published 1886-90, *The Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries* published 1902, *What is Christianity?* a series of popular lectures delivered to students

in Berlin and translated into English in 1901, and a series of very important studies in New Testament criticism.

Of *The History of Dogma* Professor E. C. Moore says:

> 'The book met, almost from the moment of its appearance, with the realization of the magnitude of that which had been achieved. It rested upon a fresh and independent study of the sources. It departed from the mechanism which had made the old treatises upon the history of doctrine formal and lifeless. Harnack realized to the full how many influences other than theological had had part in the development of doctrine. He recognized the reaction of modes of life and practice, and of external circumstances on the history of thought. His history of doctrine has thus a breadth and human quality never before attained. Philosophy, worship, morals, the development of Church government and of the canon, the common interests and passions of the age and those of the individual participants are all made tributary to his delineation.'

What is Christianity?, a brief outline of the main positions reached in *The History of Dogma*, is a brilliant example of popular exposition, though it necessarily suffers from the limitations inherent to a sketch drawn rapidly and broadly. No detailed criticism of Harnack can be quite fair if it confines itself to a work of this type and ignores the niceties of qualified and balanced statement which find their proper place in his more massive works. It consists of a series of lectures delivered extempore to some six hundred students in Berlin, taken down in shorthand by one of the students without the knowledge of the lecturer and afterwards, with few alterations, published in book form. Its importance and value met with immediate recognition. Dr. Sanday spoke of 'its fresh and vivid descriptions, its breadth of view and skilful selection of points, its frankness, its genuine enthusiasm, its persistent effort to get at the living realities of religion.' It unveiled to countless readers who were repelled and puzzled by elaborate systems of cult and doctrine and organization the power and appeal of the message of Christ.

It was to the teaching of Jesus that Harnack appealed when judging the validity of later developments in ecclesiastical doctrine, cult, and organization. Of this he was, as a historian, assured that it was possible to obtain a reliable picture from the Gospel records by the use of the methods of historical criticism. He thereby laid himself open to attacks from two sides. The Fundamentalist objects to the use of criticism. The extreme radical critic objects to the claim that it is possible from the Gospels to extract a historically reliable account of the teaching

of the Jesus of History. If the radical is right a great deal more than Harnack's system will have to go. But the most brilliant attack came from Loisy, the distinguished leader of that group of Modernists which for a time managed to maintain a precarious footing within the Roman Catholic Church. Loisy was an ecclesiastical evolutionist who justified the later developments of Catholicism on the principle that whatever is has evolved and whatever has evolved is right. His theory left no room for Harnack's distinction between accretion and legitimate development. The Gospel of Jesus must not be separated from its full explication in the life and doctrine of the Catholic Church. His position is summarized in his phrase 'The Christ in the Church and God in the Christ.' On this view the *Wesen* or 'Essence of Christianity is no more than an arbitrary intellectual abstraction from the full living Christianity of the Catholic Church. Harnack distinguished between kernel and husk, growth and decay. Loisy denied the validity of any such distinction. 'The Church has always held that within her resides the Spirit of Jesus under Whose guidance she orders her affairs in all respects. Her government, her teaching and her worship are bound up with the action of the Spirit.' He likened the full system of Catholicism to a tree which has developed from a seed. Harnack's attempt to find the essence of Christianity in the seed is absurd, seeing that the significance of the seed can only be found in the totality of the full-grown tree. Unfortunately for this argument the Church which it deified decided that neither Loisy nor his system had any part with the full-grown tree. The expulsion of the Modernists was a crushing refutation of their theological system.

In the course of a speech delivered in 1922 on the occasion of the centenary of the birth of Albert Ritschl, Harnack referred to the intellectual tendencies of the present day.

> 'Our country, nay more, the whole world of European culture, is to-day again being flooded by an international wave of romanticism. Its beginnings date back to the period preceding the outbreak of the Great War. It gained impetus from the disillusionment bred of the War and the prevalent feeling that the traditional scientific conception of things had been powerless to help men in the hour of their tribulation. Instead of knowledge men demand life. Intuition is preferred to reason. Men envisage a world replete with mysterious forces and soul-strengthening elements in compensation for the alleged collapse of all rational knowledge.'

He dwelt on the amorphous character of this romantic urge, its

fluctuating uncertain character. He saw in it some seeds of promise; but he warned his hearers that an uncritical surrender to its tendency could lead to nothing but disaster. It is a warning to which the wise will give ear. In England in our own Church there are voices which urge us to accept dogma because of its 'proved value as a guide to religious experience.' Religious value comes first; historical truth is a bad second. The non-rational element in religion is vigorously affirmed. In Germany Barth and his followers are proclaiming a neo-Calvinism which knows not Christ after the flesh, a religion divorced at the cost of the most desperate paradox from history. In the Introduction to his book, *The Rise of Christian Theology and of Ecclesiastical Dogma*, published in 1926, Harnack reaffirmed his faith in the importance of factual truth. 'History, it is true,' he wrote, 'never has the last word; but in the science of religions, and especially in that of the Christian religion, it most certainly has the first word.' He tells his readers that he has chosen his theme because he feels that under the pressure of the life and death problems which the present generation has to face we may be tempted to neglect the simple duty of loyalty to fact and historical truth. It is easy to indulge in cheap sneers at *Historismus*. It is pleasant to be able to absolve oneself from the toils of arduous research. But it is at our peril that we abandon the high standards of our fathers. He had recently in the writings of four different theologians come across the statement that theology demanded a new basis and a new method, and he was interested to note that each one of these theologians propounded a different basis and a different method. He welcomed their initiative and originality. The old should ever be eager to learn of the new; but a break in the continuity of scholarship has dangers which are very great.

The sweep of Harnack's interests was amazingly wide. In his own department he was universally recognized as a great originator, but he never allowed himself to become a mere specialist. He objected on principle to a cramped specialization.

> 'If to-day a Wilhelm von Humboldt or a Schleiermacher or an Alexander von Humboldt were to revisit the world, he would be amazed at the scope of our research and the accuracy of our methods. But would the modern investigator meet with his unreserved approbation, and would he find in him that harmonious culture which he held to be the noblest fruit of learning?'

From an early point in his career Harnack devoted himself to interests far beyond the bounds of the academic circles in which his work primarily lay, and, as the years passed by, the scope of his activities widened steadily. He took a practical interest in social, political and educational matters. He counted in public life. More than any other German scholar he possessed that universality of mind which enables a man to grasp as a unity the various elements of culture and learning, and it was therefore fitting that in 1900, its bicentenary, he should become the historian of the Berlin Academy. It was an amazing feat to produce in the same year *What is Christianity?* and his *History of the Prussian Academy of Science*, a monumental survey of the various departments of German thought during a period of two centuries. In 1905 he was appointed Director General of the Royal Library in Berlin, a post which he filled with brilliant distinction. In 1910 he became the first President of the *Kaiser Wilhelm Association for the Furtherance of Science*, an organization with wide ramifications and affiliations. It was while he was on his way to a meeting of the Association that he contracted the illness which caused his death. On the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday the Association published a special *Harnack Number* of its official organ in testimony of the admiration of his colleagues for his devotion to his work, his power of organization, and his inspiring leadership. One of his colleagues, Von. H. A. Krüss, thus writes of Harnack, the man :

> 'Harnack himself says, "The great thinker must needs ever be solitary." Why then is he not solitary? Because behind his intellectuality there stands a man richly endowed with that common humanity which annihilates the gulf between man and man. Therein lies his remarkable personal charm. Therein also lies the secret of his leadership, a leadership with which intellectual power alone could not endow him. He is, to use his own words about Wilhelm von Hamboldt, an idealist who is at the same time a true realist, a man who from the heights beholds the workaday world, and is as much master in the one sphere as in the other.'

Harnack's simple yet profound piety shines through his theological writings. The words which he spoke at the funeral of E. Troeltsch might well serve as his epitaph :

> 'He believed that life and history had meaning, and that his own personal life had meaning. That is the practical test of faith in God. He believed that the glory and humility which shine from the Cross of Christ should be the emblem and power of our life. That is the practical test of faith in Christ.'

G. L. H. Harvey.

THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH
A REPLY TO CRITICISMS

By Canon Streeter

MY recent attempt in the book *The Primitive Church*, by correlating the surviving evidence, to clear up something of the obscurity which hangs over the history of the first hundred years of Christianity has elicited much support from competent scholars, along with vigorous objection from others. I propose to make some observations on the strictures of some of the more eminent of my critics.

In the magazine *Theology*, my friend Dr. K. E. Kirk opens his review with the following paragraph :

> 'Canon Streeter's methods are those of Mr. Maskelyne or Mr. Devant. There is the same disarming appearance of transparent integrity, the same disingenuous patter, the same incredible deftness of execution; and before we can draw breath he has produced an utterly unexpected rabbit out of an entirely prosaic hat—or, to adopt Canon Streeter's own language, has evolved a wholly contemptible White Rabbit out of an entirely estimable Apostolic Father.'

When he wrote this Dr. Kirk must, I think, have for the moment forgotten that he was not entertaining a luncheon party with amusing paradoxes, but purporting to write a review for a serious periodical. At any rate, it was a surprise to me to find that the impression left upon his mind of the purpose of the book —or at any rate the impression of its purpose which he desired to give to its readers—was what he describes. About two-thirds through a book of three hundred pages I ventured to apply to Hermas a characterization of the White Rabbit penned by the creator of that immortal figure :

> 'Call him "elderly," "timid," "feeble," and "nervously shilly-shallying," and you will get something of what I meant him to be.'

But if the method and point of the book *does* really seem to any reader to have its centre in this tiny jokelet, my time in writing it has been more completely wasted than I had supposed. The words quoted do, I am prepared to maintain, aptly describe the character of Hermas as depicted by himself—whether it be the character of a real person, or, as Dr. Kirk prefers to think, of an imaginary though contemptible hero. Dr. Kirk describes Hermas as 'an entirely estimable Apostolic Father.' This sounds

sufficiently complimentary; but a little later he proceeds to amplify his description. Hermas, he tells us, is not as in my ignorance I had supposed, just a simple soul recording certain visions which had come to him, and which he (and the Church for which he wrote) accepted quite simply as divine revelations, along with a few by no means irrelevant pieces of genuine autobiography. In Dr. Kirk's view he is a man of Jesuitical disposition and considerable ability: 'he has a clear and definite policy which he means to press home . . . he shows a just apprehension of what the public wants. He knows that what modern publishers call a strong sex appeal will get him a hearing; and so he opens with the tale of the bathing lady. . . . He knows also that intimate personal touches from the author's private life always endear him to the public; and so we have the hints about his unpleasant but only too credible wife, and the shameful and—be it confessed—utterly incredible debauchery of his family. It may be a little cheap, perhaps, but it is at least clever journalism.' That is Dr. Kirk's description and defence of one whom he styles 'an entirely estimable Apostolic Father.' I wonder whether the unhappy writer would prefer to be 'white-rabbited' by me or to be championed by Dr. Kirk.

Under the caption, 'Bishop Gore's reply to Canon Streeter,' the *Church Times* for June 13 last reports a lecture given at King's College, London. A brief newspaper report may well be an inadequate representation of a lecturer's arguments; but, as I have no other account of the lecture, I must risk doing the Bishop an injustice by assuming the report to be, broadly speaking, correct.

The *Didache*, the Bishop admits, is 'certainly an awkward document.' Later on he speaks of it as 'a very uncomfortable document.' But the awkwardness and the discomfort exist only for those who, like Bishop Gore, insist on taking for granted that there was uniformity in the Church of the sub-apostolic age. On my theory, that in this period there was considerable diversity, the awkwardness vanishes. I am not concerned to argue, either that the theology of the *Didache* is adequate, or that its system of Church Order is one that I should wish to see revived. All that I maintain is, that they both represent a state of things which in the sub-apostolic age was regarded as legitimate. 'It has (says the Bishop) the appearance of a document produced

by persons of Jewish extraction, who became Christian without any adequate instruction in Christianity.' His condemnation of its theology is sweeping. 'There is no trace of the rich theology of St. Paul or St. John. . . . It contains no idea of Atonement, no Pauline Sacramentalism.' I wonder whether the Bishop has noticed that on the same score the writings of St. Luke must be as emphatically condemned. The speeches of St. Peter in the *Acts* which deal directly with the Death of Christ are notable for the absence of any suggestion that it has atoning value; and the defect is not made good later on in speeches attributed to St. Paul. St. Luke also omits St. Mark's phrase, 'a ransom for many' (which he must have read in his source), and in addition (if we accept the reading approved by Wescott and Hort) the words 'which is given for you' in his account of the Last Supper. St. Paul, it would seem, was content to number among his faithful companions a Gentile who loved and followed Christ, even though indifferent to some doctrines which the Apostle himself deemed important. The Bishop thinks that the moral instruction in the first part of the *Didache* can, from the standpoint of the historian, be separated from the latter part which deals with Church Order:

> 'The value set upon the document in the primitive Church referred only to the moral section, and not to the second part which included the controverted section on the ministry';

the latter part of the book:

> 'so far as references were found to it in subsequent literature, was referred to only with a view to contradict it.'

It is quite true that in the third and fourth centuries the Church liked the moral exhortations in the first part of the *Didache* and disliked certain things in the second part. But for the historian the essential point to notice is that what was done with this latter part was, not to 'contradict' it, but to explain it away. The divines of that period found 'contradiction,' and that of a very vigorous character, much to their taste, when dealing with persons or documents regarded as heretical. It is, therefore, the more notable that what they do to the *Didache* in the passages with which we are concerned is, not to contradict, but to paraphrase, interpret and interpolate, so as to make this very document support the system established in the third and fourth century. The author of the *Apostolic Constitutions*, for ex-

ample, reproduces almost word for word practically every sentence in the *Didache*; but he takes the sting out of the passages which he, like Bishop Gore, found 'awkward' by slightly rewriting them. Thus the passage (*Didache* 10), 'But permit the Prophets to offer thanksgiving (*i.e.* in the Eucharist) as much as they desire,' is modified so as to read, 'But permit also your Presbyters to offer thanksgiving.' The provision (*Didache* 13) about giving the first-fruits 'to the Prophets, for they are your chief priests,' becomes simply 'to the priests.' The section, 'Appoint for yourselves therefore bishops and deacons worthy of the Lord,' becomes 'Choose bishops worthy of the Lord *and presbyters* and deacons'; while 'despise them not, for they are your honourable men along with the Prophets and Teachers,' becomes, 'but do ye honour these as Fathers, as Lords, as Benefactors, as causes of well-being.'

This method of dealing with the document implies that it was ancient and venerable, that it was a document which it was more convenient to explain away than to contradict. Similarly, as Dr. Gore himself points out, the prayer, which in the *Didache* appears as the Eucharistic prayer, is recommended as a form of grace before meals by the Pseudo-Athanasius. This writer, like Dr. Gore, found it inadequate as a Eucharistic prayer; but instead of criticizing its theology, he politely disposes of it by assigning to it another purpose. These and other ecclesiastical writers treat the *Didache* much as some people treat the Bible or the rubrics in the Book of Common Prayer. They quote what they like; what they dislike, they either ignore or twist into conformity with what they think the original *ought* to have meant. But this is a procedure quite unnecessary unless a document carries considerable authority.

There is another remark of the Bishop's which calls for comment. 'The organization which it indicates was certainly not congregationalist, since the local Bishop was clearly under the control of the wandering prophets.'

As I read the *Didache*, it is only if and when a prophet settles permanently in a Church that he becomes its principal officer (cf. § 13). A wandering prophet (who is to be rejected as a false prophet if he stays more than a single night, or at most two) can hardly 'control' a Church. Indeed (to quote a sentence that occurs at an earlier point in Dr. Gore's lecture), 'Those pro-

phets are viewed as very suspicious characters, who had to be watched.' This last sentence would, no doubt, describe the attitude of certain persons to-day towards their ecclesiastical superiors; it does not justify the inference that in the primitive Church the objects of such regard were in that high position.

Some important points are raised by Canon Sparrow Simpson—I assume that an article in the *Church Times* signed W.J.S.S. is from his pen—and by Dr. N. P. Williams in his booklet *Lausanne, Lambeth and South India*. In regard to these I may crave leave to reproduce some remarks already printed in the *Church of England Newspaper*.

The sting of Canon Simpson's article is contained in the sentence:

> 'There is reason to fear that the attractive brilliancy of Canon Streeter's style has concealed from some of his readers the speculative character of the statements, and the consequent insecurity of the foundations on which he builds.'

The main effect of his article is to spread the charge of being 'speculative' and 'conjectural' over as large an area as possible of my book.

In reply I would urge three considerations:

(1) Owing to the paucity of evidence, these adjectives are applicable to every attempt to write the history of the first hundred years of Christianity which has so far appeared, and, unless fresh evidence should unexpectedly turn up, will be applicable to all future attempts to do so. My own book differs from some others, not in containing more conjectural material, but in making it quite clear which conclusions rest on solid evidence and which do not. This characteristic of the book is pointed out by Prof. J. M. Creed in his review in the *Journal of Theological Studies*:

> 'Where evidence is clear, the main stages of the history are firmly yet cautiously marked out. Where the evidence is obscure, Canon Streeter does not shrink from conjecture, yet never without making it clear to his readers where conclusions based on evidence end, and conjecture begins.'

May I illustrate this contention? There is clear evidence that in the time of St. Paul Church government in Asia was of the kind which I have called 'presbyterian,' but which Dr. Williams prefers to call 'poly-episcopal,' whereas, by the time of Ignatius, this system had been superseded in these churches

by the 'mon-episcopal.' Similarly, from Hermas and the Epistle of Clement it is clear that corporate rule was the older system at Rome also; but other evidence shows that here too it had become monarchical before the middle of the second century. Thus, there is clear evidence both in Asia and in Rome of a marked change in system. Since the evidence shows the existence of a gulf, the historian is bound to ask: How was the gulf bridged? In explanation I have hazarded the conjectures that, in the one case the personalities of the elder John and Aristion, and in the other that of Ignatius on the eve of his martyrdom, may have helped in effecting the change. This, no doubt, is a 'conjecture'; but persons who complain of its speculative character are not entitled to do so with the implication that there is really no gulf to be bridged, and that, if only people like myself would leave off speculating, it would be possible to hold that a mon-episcopal system existed in both places from the first.

(2) I adduce evidence to prove that certain statements by the Fathers about the Primitive Church, its bishops and literature, are incompatible with contemporary evidence. It would seem to follow that the Fathers indulged (though without making it clear what they were doing) in speculations and conjectures—some of which can be shown to be mistaken. If, therefore, the same thing holds of some of the conjectures (put forth avowedly as such) on which I have myself ventured, I can at least plead that I have erred in good company.

(3) Whatever may be the extent, or however valueless the quality, of the conjectures in which I have indulged, none of them affect the main contention of my book, *viz.* that at least three main types of Church Order existed in the sub-apostolic age. First, it is not a matter of conjecture that the Church of Jerusalem under James was monarchically ruled from the first. Secondly, Dr. Williams agrees with me—the argument derives from Lightfoot—that in the Pauline churches government by a Board was the rule. More than that, he adds, 'this is no new discovery, and has long been known to Catholic scholars' (*op. cit.*, p. 61). I welcome the statement; but he will perhaps concede that it is a piece of knowledge that some of his friends have shown no special anxiety to proclaim from the housetops. Thirdly, there exists the document styled the *Didache*, which

has to be explained somehow; and the most obvious explanation of it is that it represents a state of things which existed somewhere in the Christian Church in the sub-apostolic age. Exactly what part of the Church it represents is (within the large area covered by the term Syria) a matter for conjecture. My own conjecture is that it came from an important Church, most likely Antioch; Dr. Williams conjectures that it came from a 'semi-Ebionite' community, 'sequestered from the main world of Church life and thought in the mountain glens of Lebanon and Coele-Syria.'

Both of these suggestions are 'conjectures'; which of the two is the more probable? The *Didache* has exercised an enormous influence on the later literature dealing with Church Order; it and Hermas alone of the literature which during the first three centuries claimed admission to the canon of the New Testament are included, as Deutero-canonical, in the Festal Letter of Athanasius which finally settled that canon. In view of these facts I submit that, of the two conjectures, the more 'speculative' is that which assigns such an influential document to a quite unimportant church.

Moreover, if it were true that the *Didache* represents a 'semi-Ebionite' community, that would be a reason for supposing that, in a matter like Church Order, it represents views of the original apostles as to what was appropriate in Palestinian churches outside Jerusalem. Ebionism may have represented on doctrinal issues a declension from the views of the Twelve, due to their lack of the philosophic apparatus to state the doctrine of the Person of Christ in terms other than those of the picture-thinking of apocalyptic; but the Twelve were not similarly disqualified from devising a system of Church Order, supposing they thought it desirable. Semi-Ebionism was, in the main, a survival of primitive conditions. If then the *Didache* is 'semi-Ebionite,' it may represent Palestine rather than Antioch—in which case it is nearer to the actual Apostles than I had ventured to maintain. The *Didache*, I repeat, must be explained somehow; the document is there, and the historian must frame a conception of primitive Church Order which will account for its existence. My procedure is to accept it as evidence for a state of affairs existing in some not unimportant part of the Church. Any other view involves multiplying conjectures and construc-

tions, which may possibly be right, but which are far more 'speculative' in character than my simple and straightforward procedure.

I turn now to some reflections offered by Dr. Williams as to my interpretation of a passage in the *Didache* (xv, 1) which he quotes, italicizing certain words (*op. cit.*, p. 69). :

> '"Appoint therefore for yourselves bishops and deacons *worthy of the Lord, men meek and devoid of avarice and true and approved;* for they also perform for you the ministry of the Prophets and Teachers." 'The words which I have italicized (continues Dr. Williams) are omitted by Dr. Streeter in his citation of the passage on p. 145; yet they are of considerable importance, for, with their inclusion, the sentence will naturally be read, not as a command to introduce the offices of bishop and deacon into an area where they did not exist, but as an exhortation to see that persons appointed to these offices, *which are assumed already to exist,* shall possess the proper moral qualifications. It is exactly parallel to the similar exhortations in the Pastoral Epistles, and, like them, insists that ministers shall be free from the vice of avarice. It would seem, then, that the inference to be drawn from the full form of the sentence is the exact opposite of that which Dr. Streeter draws from its first part.'

Dr. Williams may possibly be correct in his contention that the word 'appoint' does not imply 'appoint for the first time.' But *if* he is right in this, and *also* in regarding as emphatic the words which he has italicized, a conclusion follows which I surmise he would be reluctant to admit. It would follow that in certain churches, about the year A.D. 100, there already existed episcopoi and deacons appointed, it is assumed, by the apostles or their successors; but that these persons were not 'worthy of the Lord . . . devoid of avarice, etc.' In that case it would look as if these churches are exhorted, owing to the moral failure of the hierarchy deriving from the apostles, to make a fresh start and appoint for themselves ministers who would be likely to do better. This, of course, is precisely what most of the Protestant Churches did do at the time of the Reformation—but not, I apprehend, with Dr. Williams' approval. Since, however, unlike Dr. Williams, I do not regard the words which I omitted, but which he has italicized, as specially important, I have no wish to press home this conclusion. I prefer to point out that the governing words of the sentence are 'Appoint for yourselves.' The word *cheirotonein* in later usage is that regularly used for ecclesiastical ordination; it may not yet have acquired that technical sense. But an interpretation which says that the words

'appoint for yourselves' mean 'accept, when appointed by some other authority,' is, I submit, 'speculative' to the verge of impossibility. This injunction to the community to appoint for itself bishops and deacons, followed by the injunction not to despise them but to regard them as of equal honour with Prophets and Teachers, must be taken in connection with that permitting the prophet complete freedom in celebrating the Eucharist. The inference that the type of Church Order implied in this document is analogous to that which nowadays is called Independency, is difficult to resist.

Dr. Williams is on firmer ground when he points out that the evidence for connecting the *Didache* with Antioch is slight. But the evidence for supposing that the Church of Antioch in the apostolic age was, if anything, more 'didachean' than the *Didache*, is less easily brushed aside.

> 'There were at Antioch, in the Church that was there, prophets and teachers, Barnabas, and Symeon that was called Niger, and Lucius of Cyrene, and Manaen the foster-brother of Herod the tetrarch, and Saul. And as they ministered to the Lord, and fasted, the Holy Ghost said: Separate me Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto I have called them. Then, when they had fasted and prayed and laid their hands on them, they sent them away' (*Acts* xiii, 1 ff).

My comment on this passage, in *The Primitive Church*, was:

> 'The five persons named are mentioned as if they were in charge of the Church, and no other officers are mentioned. The occasion was an important one; the step taken is evidently conceived of as being a corporate act of the Church, and the representative agents in this act are styled "Prophets and Teachers." Clearly, whatever other officers the Church at Antioch may have had, Prophet and Teacher are the titles borne by those of chief importance. The burden of proof lies with those who would argue that already at the time of Paul's first missionary journey the Church of Antioch possessed Episcopoi, but omitted to make use of their services on this historical occasion. For though it might be argued that Prophets, being inspired persons, might have been preferred to Episcopoi, this could hardly hold good of Teachers.'

To Dr. Williams, 'this contention appears to involve an astonishingly arbitrary use of the *argumentum e silentio*.' Undoubtedly it is an argument from silence, but why is it so 'astonishingly arbitrary'? Had there existed in Antioch at this time Episcopoi with a direct apostolic commission, and the sole power of transmitting orders and apostolic authority, is it not indeed remarkable that they should keep themselves in the background on an occasion of this sort? Moreover, as I have pointed out, the persons who are mentioned include not only Prophets,

to whom a direct revelation from the Lord might give a temporary precedence, but also Teachers. And although it is possible that the same person might be both a Teacher and an Episcopos, it is *quâ* teacher that his precedence appears to be due.

Again, there is the evidence of I *Corinthians* xii, 28 :

> 'God hath set some in the Church, first apostles, secondly prophets, thirdly teachers, then miracles, then gifts of healings, helps, governments, diverse kinds of tongues.'

This shows that until comparatively late in St. Paul's career, Prophets and Teachers were, after apostles, the two leading types of Church officer. It is, I think, probable that at Corinth episcopoi and deacons already existed—and this may have been also the case at Antioch—but if so, the natural inference from the New Testament passages quoted is that their functions at that period were more closely analogous to those of churchwardens than to those of bishops.

At any rate, I would submit that, if the silence of the *Acts* does not justify *me* in assuming the absence or unimportance of episcopoi at Antioch in the apostolic age, that same silence makes Dr. Williams' argument to the contrary in the highest degree speculative and conjectural. The one piece of positive evidence which Dr. Williams quotes for his view is a statement by Ignatius that the threefold ministry of Bishop, Presbyter and Deacons was universal : 'without these, there is not even the name of a Church.' Unfortunately this piece of evidence proves too much; for this 'threefold ministry' clearly did not exist, when St. Paul wrote, in the churches he addressed; it did not exist at Rome and Corinth in the time of Clement; nor apparently in Philippi even in the time of Ignatius. Ignatius here convicts himself either of deficient information or else of gross over-statement; and this weakens our confidence in his knowledge of primitive conditions in Antioch. To my main argument, however, I repeat, it is in no sense vital to place the *Didache* in Antioch. Until it can be proved that the *Didache* is a propaganda pamphlet by a community definitely excommunicate in the view of the whole Church, my claim stands that it represents a type of Church Order regarded as legitimate in the sub-apostolic age.

B. H. Streeter.

INDIA AND THE FUTURE OF CHRISTIANITY

By Nicol Macnicol, M.A., D.Litt., D.D.

ONE who has been called to be a representative of Christianity in the environment of the India of to-day can hardly fail to ask himself questions as to the future of the Christian Religion in that land. India, it is true, presents to us the spectacle of the swift triumph of a message of emancipation and of hope over the dark fears and cruelties that are still in that land the creation of ignorance and superstition. If the tide that has borne into the Christian Church so many of the outcasts begins to-day to slacken, the reason is plain. Other ways of freedom and of hope are opening for these victims of oppression, now that ideals that we call Christian are becoming the common possession of the more enlightened classes.

These facts give us deep reason for thankfulness; the facts that trouble us are of another order. Our questionings begin to awake when we see in the Indian environment the Christian view of God and of the world-order confronted by those ancient speculations that are summed up in the name 'the Vedanta' and by those reinterpretations and adaptations of these speculations by which it is sought to commend them to the modern mind. Dr. Inge has compared the Spartans in ancient Greece to Zulus and, just as side by side with them there were in that land Aristotle and Pericles and, later, Plotinus, so in India there have been—even while multitudes worshipped and worship still misshapen stones and trees and ghosts—great unnamed sages, dreamers of dreams that journey through eternity, intrepid system-builders. The doctrines of Shankaracharya and Ramanuja hold the allegiance of many still as the final key to truth, and even where these philosophies are recognized as outmoded the substance of their thought still governs and controls men of deep insight and discernment.

It has to be frankly recognized that among the classes in India whose outlook upon life has been dyed with this colour, Christianity has in recent years made few acknowledged con-

verts. Many would, indeed, maintain to-day that it should not be a chief aim of the Christian to win the adherents of another religious system to his side. Shall we agree, then, that all religions are equally true? Shall we adopt Mahatma Ghandi's view and say that it is wrong for us even to desire in our hearts that anyone should change his religion for ours? The element of truth wrapped within this counsel comes from the egotism that lies in wait for us all to our undoing. If that can be purged out of us and a purer love constrain, then there will still remain a Gospel to be preached by us, a truth that we must desire should prevail. There is an ultimate truth of things, a 'mystery' which, if we have laid hold of it or been laid hold of by it, 'saves,' and makes life's end shine clear. It is not possible, it would seem, that any of us shall be wholly purged of earthliness, so as to be—in the words of an Indian poet-sage of five centuries ago—'cleansed from the thought of "I."' The treasure is in vessels made of earth; of that we are sadly aware. And yet there is a treasure, to buy which the wise seeker must be willing to sell all that he hath.

There is a treasure. There is a truth, beholding which man finds his blessedness. An ancient prayer of India was, 'From the untrue lead me to the true,' and it has not, we trust, wholly died out of her heart. But what, she asks and we ask, is truth? If we bring a message to India as missionaries of the Christian faith, we have a right to do so only if we are convinced by arguments of reason, so far as these can reach, that our message is the highest truth that has been, as yet, vouchsafed to man. India has evolved a philosophy which is one of the most far-reaching and complete attempts ever made by man to explain his universe so that he may adjust his life to it. Much of it is built upon foundations of human thought that have crumbled with the ages. The old doctrine is accordingly to-day little more than a majestic ruin. Yet certain of its main principles remain and can be reconstructed into a system that appears reasonable, that wins respect, and that is in agreement with tendencies that have been widely prevalent in the past in the thought of the West and that are well established still. They may be reconstructed into a philosophico-religious system such as may attract men of all lands, a system reaching forth beyond responsibility, beyond freedom and beyond God. What may emerge is something that

can be described in the words of one of the Western evangelists of a closely similar doctrine as 'religious wisdom transposed into the key of a pure and complete naturalism.'[1]

This is the type of religion which, it would appear, is to prove the chief rival of the Christian faith and the Christian philosophy in India, but not in India alone. It emerges from the dreams and the conjectures of ancient sages among a people scarcely less God-intoxicated than once was Israel. It is the most resolute expression that has ever been formulated of a mode of thought that the mind of man has been prone to in many times and in many lands, and that it still to-day finds attractive. Thus it would appear that the conflict in India between the Vedanta, whether in its ancient or in its modernized forms, and Christianity is a conflict between two explanations of the universe that have high prestige and authority, that are deeply hostile to each other and that may represent an antagonism that is ultimate. Perhaps the final battle of the human spirit will be fought not at Armageddon, but in India and on the ancient plain of Kurukshetra.

Dr. James Denney quotes somewhere a saying cited by Sainte-Beuve to the effect that Christ has two great enemies, Priapus and Pan, and that, while you can finally conquer the former, you can never quite get rid of the latter. The God Pan has nowhere established his dominion more powerfully than he has in India. It is true that many modern Vedantists resent the description of their system as pantheism and claim that theism has had a large following in India in all periods of India's history. While that is so and while the Advaita doctrine is to be differentiated in certain respects from the pantheistic systems of Western philosophy, at the same time it can hardly be denied that the roots of Indian thinking almost throughout all the long history of this people have been monistic and pantheistic and have proved themselves to be so by the fruits in conduct and living that such thinking has borne, and by the character of the ideals that have ruled and still rule the Indian spirit. A system which denies the reality of difference and for which what takes the place of God cannot be described as either personal or ethical is in its essential quality and characteristics a pantheistic

[1] This quotation and others below from Mr. Middleton Murry are taken from his *God*.

system. Such is the spiritualistic monism of Advaita and such—in the background of its thought at such times as emotion pauses to reflect—is even the religion of *bhakti* or of the divine grace that sometimes seems to approximate so closely to Christian theism.

It is right that we should pay homage to the amazing resolution with which the Indian sages have throughout the centuries laboured to reach forth to an ultimate and satisfying unity of things. They could not rest in the toil of their reflection until they had reached the final One—the 'one without a second.' This key, of which the Indian sages laid hold so long ago, the modern Hindu is loth to surrender. There are certain defects, of which he is aware, in the view of life that ancient monism creates. It has helped to create, for example, something that Dr. Rabindranath Tagore has described as the 'Sudra habit,' a patient, unambitious mood of mind that he believes to be far too prevalent in India. 'Under its oppressive burden groans the Hindu, bowed in subjection.' This has to be got rid of. Some would find a way of escape by crude, practical measures, such as eating meat, lathi-play or fencing, 'learning how to kill scientifically.'

That, it need hardly be said, is not the road by which such Indians as Dr. Rabindranath Tagore would journey to their people's *risorgimento*. They seek to reconstruct the ancient edifice of Hindu thought so that its atmosphere shall be that of moral energy and in it free men may dwell. He and those who perceive as he does the need of a re-birth of moral strength for India are striving to loosen some of the pantheistic bonds of Hinduism and to make it into a religion that will require of its adherents faith in God and moral obedience. The question to which an answer has to be sought if we are to determine whether Christ or Pan should prevail in India is whether such moral conclusions can ever be deduced from the ancient premisses of Hindu thought, whether Advaita can be interpreted as 'the love, the oneness with All and with God'[2] unless it is transplanted from a Hindu, to what we may describe as a Christian, soil.

These are not questions to which anyone can give a careless answer. We find crude attempts being made to assimilate the great monistic formula 'Thou art that' with the teaching of Christ. 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself because,'

[2] Rabindranath Tagore, *Letters to a Friend*, p. 71.

says Professor Deussen, 'you are your neighbour . . . This is the sum and tenor of all morality.' Such shallow argument can mislead no thoughtful mind. The obliteration of personal distinctions makes an end of love and duty.

Professor Radhakrishnan, another diligent architect of the new Hinduism, does not attempt to reach a solution of the problem by any such verbal subterfuge. He, like Dr. Tagore, would bring love in as the means by which the ultimate identification with our neighbour and with God is reached. To him the *sannyasi* spirit is not that of one who has passed beyond the illusion of both good and evil, and who 'sits on the Jumna's bank, fasting and waiting and longing to die,' but of one who 'dwells in love and walks in righteousness.'

It is indeed the case to-day in India—and this is a fact of supreme significance—that religion is being judged at the bar of its moral quality and its own essential moral energy. Can it, asks Professor Radhakrishnan, 'cure its followers of the swell of passion, the thrust of desire, and the blindness of temper?' On every side, from varying motives, this is the kind of demand that is being made of religion, if it is to be followed by the India that is struggling to awake from the long stupor of its servitude.

Not only does the philosopher demand a new religion that shall pass this test, but the politician likewise. 'The one need of the times,' says Mr. M. R. Jayakar, one of the leaders of the popular nationalist movement, 'is to expand the spirit of Hinduism, to liberalize it so that all who profess it, however low or depressed, will find in it a living solace, a guide on all occasions when their minds are troubled.' 'We must have such a religion,' many are saying, 'or, if we cannot get it, we shall have none at all.' And indeed the perilous road of 'anti-religion' is already being taken by many of the new generation who feel the intolerable yoke of the old doctrine of despair and who are crying, 'We must be free or die.'

Thus the question to which we are forced back, if we are to determine the future of Christianity in India is: Is Christ the only teacher who can open the gates of new life to her, or can the old message be remade to fit the needs of the modern Hindu mind? If we place Christianity and the higher Hinduism face to face, what are the actual alternatives between which India has to choose? Professor Radhakrishnan says of himself that he is

'lighting a little candle in the darkness.' It casts after all a very feeble and flickering flame in the great, dark, many-chambered house of Hinduism. There are, however, certain contrasts with Christian belief that it or any other illuminant exhibits to us. We shall, perhaps, find that there are consequences that appear to deduce themselves inevitably from the intellectual presuppositions of Hinduism and of every pantheistic doctrine, and if India, or indeed any human soul anywhere, is to escape from them, one way at least of hope is that which Christ has opened.

Thus, in the first place, a consequence from which any system that is pantheistic seems unable to escape is that of the bound human will. There is, indeed, one may boldly claim, only one alternative to a Monism that in the words of von Hügel 'flattens everything out,' freedom and penitence and forgiveness and all the wealth and joy and sorrow of our personal life. The only satisfying alternative is that of a faith set upon a transcendent God of love, a holy Father. A Calvinism such as that of Browning's *Johannes Agricola in Meditation* has, of course, ceased to be Christian and made Pan its god. The Christian is not under the rule of necessity, but of the God to whom Jesus could say, 'I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because Thou hast hid . . . and hast revealed.' The boundaries between the rule of Fate and the rule of such a transcendent God cannot be drawn by human reason, but they represent a whole world of difference, and a people that would grow to the manhood that is meant to be theirs will choose the mild yoke of Him before whom Jesus bowed.

There is no doubt that, under the influence of what von Hügel calls 'the almost universal pantheism of our time,' there has come among us a weakening of hope, a despairing acceptance of what seems to many the inevitable march of circumstance. The tendency towards such an attitude in a stubborn world has been always present even among those who call themselves Christians. When Thomas Hardy formulated his view of the 'Urging Immanence' in things, 'An automatic sense, Unweeting why or whence,' he seems to have been scarcely aware that he could no longer consider himself an orthodox member of the Parish Church. It has been pointed out that the view of life which he sets forth in *The Dynasts* is one scarcely different from that of many of the peasants of the English

countryside round about him, for whom God and the order of Nature are scarcely distinguished from each other. In India, too, the peasant will often say, 'The Doer and the Causer to do are one,' while seeking to strengthen himself to bear some sorrow or endeavouring, perhaps, to palliate some crime. In his use of the pantheistic formula he may often mean much the same as many a Christian means who bows his head and says, 'God's will be done.'

But near as the attitudes of the Christian and the Hindu may approach in our unfaithful practice there is, indeed, a whole universe of distance between Christ in the Garden of Gethsemane with His Father and the Hindu ascetic of whom it is told that in the Mutiny days he turned his dying eyes upon the British soldier who had bayonetted him, saying, 'And thou too art He.' Which is the true account of the universe, that which is aware, as Jesus was, of a gracious and transcendent Will behind it and above it, to Whom He could say, 'Father,' or that which knows only, without as within, an 'Urging Immanence,' a moving tide upon which the human soul floats, calm, indeed, but inert? The Hindu view in all its varying forms gives, it seems inevitably, a prevailing tone and colour to life. It creates in many a certain quiet dignity of deportment that one recognizes as contributing greatly to the charm of the Hindu character. It is the source, at the same time, of what is undoubtedly a very serious weakness. The good and the evil effects upon character of this outlook upon life may be indicated as serenity on the one hand and indifference on the other; or again, as patience and the capacity for endurance on the one hand and feebleness of effort and moral inertia on the other. There are, we perceive, two kinds of serenity, one that of a strong and steadfast dependence upon a divine will of love and holiness, the other that which proceeds from an indifference to all things as meaningless and unreal and therefore undeserving of our concern. There are two kinds of patience, one that of faith in the overcoming power of goodness and of God, the patience in which, as Christ says, we win our souls; the other the patience that looks round wearily upon a world that has no purpose or end. The first of these two alternative kinds of moral attitude is that of the Christian, the second is that of the Hindu. Between the two and dividing them from each other lies a whole moral universe.

Not only is this the attitude of the Hindu; it is, in its essentials, that of many of the outstanding figures in the Western world to-day. A. E. Housman, or Thomas Hardy, or J. Middleton Murry—their personal reactions from the conclusions that they reach as to life and its worth and significance differ, but the conclusions reached by them are closely similar. In one there may be an element of the old Epicureanism, 'Shoulder the sky, my lad, and drink your ale': in another there is the Stoic spirit of Epictetus or Cleanthes, of 'a bird deprived of wings': in a third there is a sense that the inward division is healed, a sense of inward harmony and of liberation. Acceptance in each case comes from the necessity of things; 'the freedom of the will,' they might say with Mr. Middleton Murry, 'is an adolescent fiction.' They might all say also, with the same writer, that God has become 'too vast to be their friend, too intimate to be their enemy.'

Over against this tide of thought which is setting so strongly across the world alike in India and in the lands of the West, we have to set the Christian conviction, a conviction irreconcilable with it in its central principles and in its effects. Centrally the Christian conviction is a conviction of the Grace of God. God is, and He is the Rewarder of them that diligently seek Him. There are two things in the monistic doctrine that commend themselves as of the utmost value and indeed necessity to our thinking and living—the demand for an ultimate unity and the emphasis upon human surrender and acceptance. Are these incompatible with Christian belief? On the contrary it demands them. It holds by a unity of all things in God, as One who is 'the transcendent ground of the teleologically ordered world.' This is a living and organic unity, such as we can rest in, and it takes up into itself, without destroying their reality, the differences that make up our moral and intellectual life.

> For only where the One is twain,
> And where the two are One again,
> Will truth no more be sought in vain.

Such is the unity of personal relationship mediated by love and symbolized in the region of ultimate being by the doctrine of the Trinity. So also that personal surrender and acceptance which seems to the pantheistic mysticism of the East and of the West so tranquillizing, and even to some so liberating, has its counter-

part on a higher level in surrender to the gracious purpose of God. 'I run, I run, I am gathered to Thy breast.' But how different is the surrender of a free will to the great Will of good from the extinction of an imaginary will before the throb of the universe. Salvation both to the Hindu philosopher and to the Christian penitent is something that is not our doing. 'The soul,' says a modern Hindu, 'is like a lighted lamp covered by a deep shade. Remove the shade and the light comes out. The removal of the shade does not produce the light. It was all the time there.' This is what Mr. Murry calls 'self-acceptance.' But while 'this new harmony is our creation, we can take no credit for it.' There is no boasting for either the Hindu or the Christian, but for the Christian there is gratitude. There are, as St. Augustine said long ago, contrasting the salvation he experienced with that of the Neo-platonists, 'the tears of confession, the broken and humbled heart.' The Christian salvation comes to us from without, with a mysterious Hand holding it out to us, with a mysterious and ineffable Personality behind it.

It is perfectly evident that we have here two kinds of religion, separated by a gulf that can never be bridged. They are different in their basal conceptions of the universe and they are different in the fruits they bear in human life and character. They represent two opposites that confront each other not only in India, but in every land where thought is alive. Is humanity finally enslaved, whether its bondage be that of *karma* or of 'natural law'—in either case 'bound in affliction and iron'? Mahatma Gandhi, describing to Dr. Stanley Jones his own journey towards God, summed up his outlook in the words, 'No miracles can be expected and it may take ages.' That is the outlook of one who dilutes the pantheistic Hinduism of the philosophic schools which he has inherited with a theistic faith in a shadowy God to whom he prays. The demands of the Hindu heart have always throughout Indian history made themselves thus felt, and the relentless pantheism of the prevailing systems has been accompanied by hopes of escape, though 'it may take ages.' Whether in the East or in the West the need of men is for a Helper who is transcendent and personal, and such a Helper Christianity brings to them.

THE JESUS OF HISTORY AND THE CHRIST OF FAITH

By Professor Maurice Goguel, D.Litt., D.Th., D.D., École des Hautes Études and Faculté Libre de Théologie Protestante, Paris, author of *Introduction au Nouveau Testament* (5 vols.), *Le Texte et les Éditions du Nouveau Testament*, etc.

Translated by the Rev. C. J. Wright, B.D.

Article III.

RATHER than sacrifice one of the problems to the other, many think it would be better to subordinate one to the other. The religious problem, in any case, cannot be subordinated to the historical problem because, if we may make use of the happy terminology introduced by the Ritchlian theology, history declares only judgments of fact and religion only lives by judgments of value.

Can we subordinate the historical to the religious problem? This is the thesis of Catholic theologians. Maintaining that no one is in a position to free himself wholly from his own philosophy, from his beliefs and his unbeliefs, they think it better to renounce an objectivity unobtainable by the human mind and to acknowledge that the field of Biblical researches is lit up by the light of dogma. The infallible *magisterium* of the Church makes up for the insufficiency of documents and puts an end to the hesitations of exegetes in their mode of employing them. Where pronouncement has been made there are no more problems, whether historical or other; there are but dogmas, and the *rôle* of the historian is merely to show that the solidity of doctrine is not disturbed by the objections formulated by the sceptical on the terrain of history. Such is the task which Père de Grandmaison has set himself in the two volumes of his *Jésus Christ* to which he has devoted the work of a life-time. Such an attitude—is it necessary to state it directly—cannot be adopted by those who refuse to seek in an exterior authority the foundation of their spiritual life.

There are not wanting, however, Protestant theologians who, without subordinating history to an exterior authority,

deem that the person of Jesus, being at the same time a historical fact and a supra-historical fact, is not entirely amenable to the methods of history. There may be applied to Him the ordinary processes of analysis, of criticism and of historical reconstruction, but on the condition that they be controlled and, when needed, rectified and completed by another method inspired by the supra-historical character of the object investigated. This method consists in setting out from the specifically Christian religious experience in order to ascend thence by the inductive road to the person of Christ as to its first cause. Let us admit, in order to simplify the discussion (though it is very far from being evident) that it is possible to define this Christian experience with adequate precision. Let us suppose, a no less hardy supposition, that no other factor, not specifically Christian, has determined this experience even in an accessory manner. Would it be possible to ascend from the effect to the cause? Do we know sufficiently the laws and the mechanism of religious psychology to be able to make such an induction? Further, the specifically Christian experience is only an abstraction; the reality is the experience of individuals, and of individuals whose spiritual development has been, in any case to a large extent, determined by the impression produced by the traditional conceptions of the person and of the history of Jesus. To invoke this witness of the Christian consciousness to complete or to correct the results of critical work is to return by a detour to tradition, even when it has been seen that it has not such a solidity as would inspire a blind trust in it. In reality this is to complete a vicious circle.

It is also to make a paralogism, for it involves passing from one magnitude to another, from the Christ who lives and acts in the souls of those who believe in Him, to the Jesus who lived in Palestine nineteen centuries ago. I certainly do not intend to say that there is no bond between these two magnitudes. The fact that they are not identical suffices to render it impossible to invoke the witness of the religious consciousness to determine the historical portrait of Jesus.

Besides which, the Christ of faith and of experience is very far from being at all times a self-identical magnitude. Each generation pours into the idea which it formulates of Him the

contents of its preoccupations and of its aspirations. Each has created a Christ, not perhaps in its own image, but in the image of its ideal. And it is because the historians have not always distinguished sufficiently carefully between their historical conception of Jesus and their idea of the eternal Christ that they have sketched pictures of the life and person of Jesus which have so much varied. Weinel wrote a book entitled *Jesus in the Nineteenth Century*. One might write another, much lengthier, *Jesus from the First to the Twentieth Century*, which would show how the conceptions peculiar to the diverse periods of the history of Christianity are reflected in the portraits which have been successively sketched of Him.

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The discussions which precede, though a trifle long, have been necessary in order that we may now directly broach the problem, not with the fallacious hope of presenting a carefully elaborated solution, but with the more modest ambition of indicating in what way and in what spirit it must be considered so as to overcome the oppositions and the antinomies which apparently constitute it.

Let us be clear at the outset as to what history is. The discussion we have been led to make on the ideas of M. Bertram has already cleared up some points. The question, however, is far from being exhausted. We have put on one side the conception according to which the ultimate goal of history would be the determination of the laws of human evolution conceived as a rigorously necessary concatenation of facts which are not only to be explained by one another, but which beget one another. We have insisted on the desirability of not confounding history, the simple statement of the past, with the philosophy of history. This distinction must serve not merely to give order to the historian's work. It is a question not only of stating at leisure before beginning to explain. To establish the past with the *arrière-pensèe* that the result will be of service later, either to oneself or to others, to disengage laws, is to be liable to the domination in the work of the discovery of the facts by the idea of an absolute and necessary connection. History is not even so a mere accumulation of facts; it is not to be reduced to criticism whose task is to submit the documents to a work of

analysis and control destined to disengage the positive information they contain. And one might, without too much trouble, show that if the studies relative to Jesus have been for a generation passing through a crisis which explains the scepticism or at least the agnosticism with which the Jesus of history is so frequently envisaged by our contemporaries, it is because He has been sought by a method exclusively critical and not sufficiently historical. This method leads to the breaking up of tradition into an impalpable dust which the slightest breath may disperse and which, in any case, does not constitute blocks of material sufficiently consistent for a solid construction. History cannot be content with that. Henri Poincaré has said : ' Science is made with facts as a house with stones, but an accumulation of facts is no more a science than a heap of stones a house.' This is also true of history. There is historical science only where there is construction, that is to say, concatenation of facts. It is impossible to achieve history without seeking to set forth the relations which are empirically given. It is a question of bringing to light the explanations furnished by the facts themselves, not in any wise of constructing a system of explanation which leaves apart from itself no residue. What character, then, can a historical explanation of Christianity possess? History is a unity, and the rules of its method do not vary in their nature. They do not, however, constitute a body of technical processes capable of being applied in a quasi-mechanical manner. We do not achieve the history of a war as we do that of a social movement, the history of letters or of arts, as that of the sciences. In each particular case the method must be appropriate to the specific character of the object studied and to the nature of the problem or problems presented. Let us try to apply this to the problem of Jesus.

We cannot understand Jesus and His ministry if we consider only the external circumstances which influenced the development and the incidents of His career. His teaching astonished, even scandalized, the Pharisees and the Scribes, these official representatives of the religious tradition of Judaism. The influence, without doubt more superficial than profound, yet real never the less, which it exercised over the crowd aroused their uneasiness and their jealousy; and thus is explained the genesis

of a conflict which in its development led to the events of the passion. Nor must one neglect the importance of the susceptibilities of Pilate—it matters little whether these were self-generated or whether they were already suggested by the Jewish authorities. The *rôle* of the Romans, indeed, was a much more active one in the history of the passion than the actual state of the Gospel narratives would lead us to believe. Pilate was not limited to the compulsory ratification, under the irresistible pressure of a populace stirred up by the priests, of a condemnation pronounced by the Sanhedrin. He himself ordered the arrest of Jesus as is proved by a fragment of very ancient tradition preserved in the Fourth Gospel, according to which Jesus would have been arrested by the cohort led by the tribune (*Jn.* xviii, 3, 12), and as is also proved by the fact that if there had been a Jewish condemnation ratified by the Roman authority, Jesus would have been stoned or strangled, but not crucified by soldiers, which is a specifically Roman punishment.

Neither must we ignore the *rôle* played by the hostility of Herod Antipas, the tetrach of Galilee, in the external development of the career of Jesus. The Gospel of Luke (xiii, 32) has preserved a narrative which appears to me, for reasons it would take too long to develop, to rest on an excellent tradition. Some Pharisees, he narrates, came one day to Jesus and said to Him : Get thee out and go hence, for Herod would fain kill thee.' Mark speaks somewhere (II, 6) of a conventicle held by the Pharisees and Herodians who sought together a way to destroy Jesus. This also comes from tradition, for in the actual narrative of Mark this conventicle does not issue in any effect. Why did Herod wish to kill Jesus? Certainly for reasons identical to those by which the Jewish historian Flavius Josephus explains that he killed John the Baptist. 'Herod,' said Josephus, 'was afraid that the influence John had on the people would provoke disturbances, for all were accustomed to follow his counsels. He preferred to prevent by an execution what might have been done by John rather than have to regret an accomplished fact' (*Ant. J.* xviii, 5, 2). The hostility of Herod explains that from a certain time, approximately from the epoch of the multiplication of the loaves, the ministry of Jesus was not only that of an itinerant, but that of a wanderer; that He could now only make

rare and fugitive appearances in the region of Capernaum, and that most frequently he had to keep to desert places, sometimes to take refuge outside Galilee. This hostility of Herod decided Jesus finally to leave Galilee and come to Judea and Jerusalem.

But once having recognized the *rôle* of these factors, not always sufficiently recognized perhaps, can we say that we have explained the history of Jesus? I do not think so, for the facts themselves of which we speak need to be explained. To begin with, this scandal which the Scribes felt on hearing Jesus, this budding popular favour which provokes the uneasiness of Herod, these are not primary data, but facts whose explanation must be sought in the essential teaching of Jesus. Neither the jealousy of the Pharisees and of the Scribes, more probably of certain Pharisees and certain Scribes, nor the hostility of Herod, and, later, that of Pilate, explain the Gospel drama. To avoid the effect of all these hatreds it would have sufficed Jesus to be silent. As He had escaped Herod by quitting Galilee, He could have escaped Pilate by taking refuge in some distant and unknown retreat. Had he limited Himself to disavowing before the Sanhedrin the pretentions attributed to Him, He would probably have saved His life. Why did He not do so? Because He felt He had received a message from God to take to His people, a work to fulfil, and because obedience to the Divine will had in His eyes more value than life itself. He would not be faithless to His mission, and that is why He died.

Thus the true explanation of Jesus and of His history must be sought for in the domain of His thought and of His consciousness of vocation. Large volumes have been written on the essence of the preaching of Jesus without always recognizing that in accumulating—as has been done in order to seek an explanation from passages of the Old Testament—aphorisms of the Rabbis, maxims of philosophers and of moralists more or less analogous to this or that word of Jesus, the problem has been obscured and swamped rather than illuminated. To understand a teaching like that of Jesus, one must take one's point of departure from the centre, not from the periphery. One must, first of all, consider the mind and the inspiration of Jesus; it is by these that the materials which reveal to us His teaching are made clear. Jesus remains faithful to the religious tradition

of His people in the sense that, to Him, God is the sovereign Lord whose will must be accomplished, but while Judaism reduced this obedience to the observation of the commandments formulated in the law and sought, by a clever dialectic, to realize, if one may so speak, this obedience as cheaply as possible by applying itself to enlarge the domain of things permitted from those commanded and those forbidden, Jesus wished this obedience to be complete and entire. He defined it by the formula in the Sermon on the Mount: 'Be ye perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect' (*Mt.* v, 48). What this word affirms is the necessity of a complete obedience which realizes in human life the essential being of God. For such a programme to be even proposed, God must reveal Himself otherwise than in fragmentary and ever incomplete precepts of a law. Jesus affirms, then, a new notion of the Divine revelation. To Him, the sovereign Lord of heaven is at the same time the God within, the God who speaks to His child. Jesus has, with an absolute intensity and depth, the consciousness of the presence of God, of communion with Him. He has the conviction that life, His own life, can have no other object than that of doing the will of God. His vocation is to call men to obey Him in order to ensure the accomplishment of the Divine will.

But Jesus has much too keen a sense of realities not to see that the attitude of men does not conform with this ideal and that He alone lives in an absolute communion with God. From this two consequences follow. The first is that the consciousness Jesus had of communion with God takes the character of the conviction of a unique vocation. He does not feel Himself only one of the children of the Heavenly Father, but His messenger, His Son. And on the other hand, in order that men should realize their true destiny and become in reality the children of the Heavenly Father such as they are called to be, they must be converted and repent. This is why, when Jesus hears that John the Baptist is preaching repentance in view of the imminent judgment and that He is baptizing, He joins him.

This, however, is but a provisional halting-place. Jesus cannot rest there because He goes to the roots of the notion of repentance and perceives its insufficiency. Repentance, indeed, whatever its effects for the future, is incapable of abolishing the

past. It can only ensure that, before the tribunal of the Messiah, who will judge with strict equity, men will merit other than condemnation. If repentance is necessary—and to the end Jesus proclaims that it is—it is inadequate to give the penitent access to the Divine Kingdom.

In order that God's designs should be accomplished, and that when His kingdom should come it should not be a kingdom in a desert, another factor must intervene. Access to the Kingdom of God will be gained for the repentant sinner by the Grace of a God who will forgive the sinner provided he accepts the message which Jesus brings to him. It is this message of Divine forgiveness which properly constitutes the Gospel.

The explanation of Jesus and of His works is, then, in the last analysis, this revelation of the God who loves the sinner, not because He discovers in the death in which he is struggling a spark of life capable of being reanimated and of restoring him to his former destiny, but precisely because he is lost and condemned, and because for him there is no hope of salvation, because for him there is no other possibility of life than the love of Almighty God. It would be easy to show how the whole ministry of Jesus, His acceptance of suffering, His faith in His glorious return, spring from His immediate and direct consciousness of this Almighty God who is love. *There* is, it matters little whether one takes this term in its theological sense or not, the revelation which Jesus brought to humanity.

But whence comes this idea itself? In an admirable study in which he seeks to disengage the originality of Christianity and the explanation of its triumph over the various religions with which it was in competition in the ancient world, Karl Holl showed that the idea of a God who loves the sinner and wills to forgive him is, without ceasing to be the God of absolute holiness, no less contrary to the Greek mind that to the Jewish.

Of this idea, whence is derived the whole Gospel of Jesus, there is no explanation. History can only make this assertion: it sprang from the depths of the consciousness of Jesus.

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It might without doubt seem to some that in trying to explain, as I have just sought, Jesus and the Gospel, I have strayed from the subject before us. I return now, or more exactly I have

never left it. If the last word of history on Jesus is that He brought to the world the notion of the holy pardoning God, then it might be that the solution of our problem is much more simple than has often been believed. It must be sought in quite another way from that of speculation on the historic and the supra-historic and on their relations. History affirms that Jesus brought this quite new idea of God. Faith employs here another term, that of revelation, but in doing so it takes its point of departure in the facts of history and confines itself to interpreting them. The Fourth Gospel makes Christ say: 'I am the way: no one cometh unto the Father except by me' (*John* xiv, 6). A way—this is certainly what the Jesus of History is, a way which leads to the God who is revealed in the consciousness of Jesus. By this simple formula we see that the historical investigation is indispensable, for without it contact would be lost with the revealer of the God of holiness and love; also that it is insufficient, because to know something of the interior life of Jesus is not yet to have in oneself a spark of this life.

Often history is opposed to faith. This, we can say it now, is a dangerous misapprehension. History is the foundation of faith, because it puts us in touch with a consciousness in which God revealed Himself. We must neither exaggerate nor depreciate the value of the formulas in which this faith is expressed nor try to judge them according to their agreement or disagreement with the conclusions of history. Neither must we take them for what they are not. They do not express a transcendent doctrine which has an absolute value in itself. They have meaning only in the measure in which they express and seek to interpret what constituted the originality of the person of Jesus, and the revelation He brought to humanity. The person of Jesus is thus the point of meeting and contact between history and faith, the point to which it is sufficient to return in order to dispel the apparent conflict. To evoke the real Jesus of history in the holiness of His life and in the unequalled purity of His religious consciousness is not only to discover the positive explanation of the birth and development of Christianity, it is also to give to the spiritual life its true foundation and to faith the substantial sustenance indispensable for its life.

HUMAN MERIT ACCORDING TO JESUS AND PAUL

By F. A. M. Spencer, D.D.

ON the face of it the attitudes of our Lord and of St. Paul towards the Jewish Law differed widely. Jesus is recorded as saying that He came to 'fulfil,' which, as the sequel shows, means to 'complete,' the law; St. Paul declared that Christians 'were made dead to the law through Christ.' Both were strongly opposed to Judaistic legalism, particularly in its Pharisaic form; but whereas Jesus attacked the Pharisees for their hypocritical evasion of the law, St. Paul declared that the attempt to become righteous by means of the law was vain, and that by faith alone could a man be justified in the sight of God.

The gravamen of the charge of Jesus against the legalists seems to have been that the morality that they practised was self-centred: they aimed at righteousness for the sake of righteousness, or rather to win the favour of God for themselves, instead of disinterestedly directing their conduct to the service of a neighbour or the furtherance of some divine end. Thus. He blamed them for adapting life to the Sabbath, instead of the Sabbath to life. He maintained that sinners had the first claim on His time and energies, illustrating His point from the medical sphere. He held up to scorn the satisfaction of a Pharisee at being more pious and virtuous than other people. The trouble with this Pharisee was obviously, not that he attributed his superiority to his own effort, since he explicitly thanked God for giving him this; it lay rather in his heartless delight at his own fancied good state in contrast with the bad state of his neighbours. But this was only the logical outcome of the ideal of personal righteousness for its own sake and its advantages.

St. Paul's standpoint is different. He was conscious that as a devout follower of the Pharisaic tradition he had never won the peace that comes of the consciousness of being in harmony with God. But he was aware that he did attain this peace when he accepted Jesus as the Christ and surrendered himself to Him. Accordingly he formulated his doctrine of salvation by saying

that it is not by works that a man is justified, but by faith. He attacked pride in another way than his Master did—namely, on the ground that it is impossible for anyone to be righteous by his own effort, but he is accounted righteous by the altogether undeserved mercy of God, and so put into a position in which by the aid of the Spirit of God he is able in course of time to become actually righteous—as he expresses it: 'Where then is boasting? It is excluded. By what manner of law? Of works? Nay; but by a law of faith.' He means that because men are hopelessly sinful and incapable of reaching the Divine standard if left to themselves, they have absolutely nothing to boast about. God of His extreme forbearance and kindness—of His 'grace,' as he calls it—has provided another method than that of painstaking obedience to a code of morals and ceremonial piety, for becoming what He requires that they shall be. This method consists in attachment and self-surrender to Christ, especially in His sacrificial death and triumphant resurrection, in response to which they are graciously admitted into spiritual contact with God, and remaining therein will develop the nature and character essential to Divine sonship. St. Paul does not mean that men are actually *made* righteous (according to the later patristic and mediaeval misinterpretation of 'justification,' that led direct to the crudities of predestinarianism), but that by being treated as righteous—in other words, by being in virtue of their faith in Christ admitted to spiritual fellowship with God as His sons—they are henceforth rendered capable of good deeds and the development of good character. St. Paul does not intend to deny freedom or to discourage effort in those who are already justified; for he tells his converts to 'work out their own salvation' and constantly exhorts them to live worthily of their Christian profession. But, since it is only by the unutterable kindness or indulgence of God in overlooking the past and providing at such a terrible cost the means of their redemption that they are in a position to be able to work out their own salvation, they have no right to pride themselves on any achievements or attainments in the path of holiness.

Now all this, I submit, constitutes a different argument against pride or self-congratulation on one's own moral conduct or character than is implied in our Lord's criticism of the Phari-

sees. St. Paul says that boasting is excluded or unjustifiable because man has nothing to boast about: 'What hast thou that thou didst not receive?' But Jesus, as I interpret Him, objects to boasting because it represents a radically wrong attitude of the superior to the inferior, or of the righteous to the unrighteous. In fact, it spoils the righteousness and transforms it into its opposite. Even if we may suppose that the Pharisee by his own heroic efforts had meritoriously acquired a good character, and that the Publican by his own fault had inexcusably allowed his character to deteriorate, still that would have been no reason why the former should plume himself on his own virtue and crow over the vice of the other. It is cruelly insulting to treat another's degradation as a foil to set off one's own nobility. We cannot imagine Jesus parading His own goodness or feeling pleased at being the only perfectly holy individual in a world of sinners. It is not only the law of faith that excludes boasting, but the nature of love itself.

No doubt, a certain amount of what we call 'self-respect' and even delight at being praised is a legitimate support to moral endeavours. Without the capacity to be pleased at hearing the praise, 'Well done! good and faithful servant,' there would be no capacity for genuine shame at the rebuke, 'Thou wicked and slothful servant!' Yet it is to be noted that these words of praise and rebuke in the mouth of Jesus refer, not to moral qualities, but to the results of moral acts. He seems to imply that we should be pleased, not so much at the goodness of our conduct or character, but rather at the good which we achieve by means of our acts and labours. Similarly, we cannot think that Jesus prided Himself on His power as a faith-healer, but we may be sure that He was delighted when He saw sufferers become well and happy as the result of His healing touch.

All this is certainly not meant as any disparagement of the genius of St. Paul. He contributed to Christianity something which, if we may reverently say so, Jesus was not in a position to give—namely, *expression of the sense of alienation from God and of reconciliation to God*. Nevertheless, we must be on our guard against interpretations of the mind of Jesus through the eyes of St. Paul, particularly of St. Paul when he is concentrating on the transition from the state of sin to the state of salva-

tion. It was due to the special character of the religious ethic in which he had been educated that his experience of salvation and his exposition of it assumed its peculiar form. Just because the Judaistic ethic presented such a self-contained and self-conscious ideal, it naturally produced in one so conscientious and religiously ardent as St. Paul the sense of painful futility and balked longing. The more vehemently he tried, the more, to use an expressive metaphor of William James, he got 'jammed' (*Varieties*, p. 209). Psychologically St. Paul's malady is not very hard to diagnose. His code of righteousness being essentially of a self-regarding order, the more scrupulously and earnestly he carried it out, the more self-regarding he became, and therefore the more sinful. Nothing but an object outside himself attracting his attention and winning his regard could break this vicious introversion and relieve the awful tension of his soul. The object which did this for him was the figure of the Crucified. But if he had been schooled in a less egoistic and more humanitarian ethic, he would not have had that sense of total incapacity for merit upon which he based his doctrine of salvation, while his reverence for Christ might have been none the less.

Jesus, on the contrary, did not have only such intense souls to deal with, but also people of a more normal virtue, compassionate like the Good Samaritan, generous like the woman who gave away her two mites, high-minded like the Scribe who knew the two commandments of love, hero-worshippers like Peter, besides more commonplace sorts. He was ready with praise and approval where it was due, and appreciated the relatively unspoilt human nature of children and simple folk. The Jewish law He knew to be inadequate, but He probably regarded it as educative, not as St. Paul conceived it when he called it 'a slave-tutor to bring us to Christ' and wrote that 'the law came in beside, that the trespass might abound,' but in the more natural way of training men in the elements of religion and virtue. So He set about 'fulfilling' it, requiring that words and thoughts should be reformed along with deeds, and that enemies should be loved as well as friends. It might be objected that we cannot love to order, especially not those who have deeply wronged or insulted us. Nevertheless, it is possible to direct our attention

away from their bad qualities to their good qualities, and by picturing to ourselves their unenviable condition to conjure up a little sympathy for them, and to seize opportunities to do them some service. So much the law in its expanded form as delivered by Jesus could effect.

Doubtless, Jesus thought of all law as being transcended in the spontaneous doing and living of the children of God, so that it would become as natural for them to help any in distress, even bad people, as it is for a mother to succour her own children, even when they have naughty fits. In this He would have agreed with St. Paul that the 'fruit,' the natural outcome, of the Spirit is love and all other virtues. But Jesus, with His wide and sympathetic vision upon the drifting multitudes, 'like sheep without a shepherd,' discerned genuine goodness in many hearts, where St. Paul saw only that 'there is none righteous; no, not one!'

We must beware of reading Jesus through the eyes of St. Paul. It is even more disastrous to read Him in the light of the warped Paulinism of a Luther or a Karl Barth. It is not true that Jesus looked to sinners as suitable pioneers or first members of the Kingdom of God—sinners such as those who committed the 'unpardonable' offence of calling the restoration of a madman to sanity a devilish act, or those who caused 'little ones to stumble,' or rich men who neglected beggars at their gates, or disciples who betrayed their masters. What kinds He really preferred may be gathered from the beatitudes. Such formed the good soil, well prepared under the best influence of the old religion, to receive the seed of the Gospel. Certainly He hoped that sinners would eventually be brought in, and went out of His way to give them a helping hand. And some of those generally considered to be the worst characters, but perhaps many of them 'more sinned against than sinning,' He thought would be likely to repent and reform before the finer-grained products of a doctrinaire and over-strained piety. But it is a misconception to suppose that He held that the really most wicked—the monsters of cruelty and sensuality—would be among the first of His adherents.

It is a common criticism levelled against writers on Christian ethics to say that they wrongly present Jesus as a predominantly ethical teacher. But who, outside the ranks of the sceptics, ever

belittled His religious teaching or denied that He based His ethics on His religion? We all know that He called the obligation to love God with heart and mind and will the first and great commandment, that He spoke earnestly and emphatically concerning prayer and its marvellous efficacy and Himself prayed frequently, that He deduced the duty of loving our enemies from the love that God has for His enemies. What is probably intended, rather obscurely, by this criticism, is that Jesus is sometimes represented as having no doctrine of Redemption, such as St. Paul gives—a very different matter.

It would assuredly be a grave error to consider the preaching of the Kingdom of God as sufficient in itself. Rather, would I argue, it was His comparative failure to induce men to repent—that is, to reconstruct their lives on the principles of love to God and man—that drove Jesus to Calvary. The Sermon on the Mount had to be implemented by the Cross. How this was so, apparently He left no theory to explain, and we must go to St. Paul for the first definite doctrine on the subject. But that He believed it, we can hardly doubt; else why did He deliberately challenge the authorities at Jerusalem? I would very briefly suggest that the preaching of Jesus that the supreme goodness, which is love, should overcome the supreme evil, which is hate, needed to be enforced by a supreme act of love conquering hate, as expressed in the prayer, 'Father, forgive them.' In any case, the ethical study of the Gospel, though only one method of approach, may, if we pursue it to its end, lead us to the full truth of God as it was and eternally is in Jesus Christ.

BOOK REVIEWS

AN IMPORTANT CRITICISM OF BARTH'S THEOLOGY *

Among recent volumes in the series of *Studien zur systematischen Theologie* there has been published a study by Georg Hoffmann of the eschatological element in German theology since the time of Schleiermacier.* It is a timely survey, for the stress laid on eschatology by the school of New Testament criticism, of which Schweitzer is the chief exponent, has of late years naturally caused repercussions within the sphere of dogmatic theology. Hoffmann divides eschatological systems into two main groups, the temporal (*endzeitliche Eschatologie*) and the supra-temporal. Of the second group Karl Barth's is the most uncompromising. In the course of a careful account of the main outlines of Barth's 'dialectic

* *Das Problem der letzten Dinge in der neuerer evangelische Theologie.* (Pub. Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Göttingen: 1929.)

theology' Hoffmann indicates how Barth has been led on to a positive transformation of his fundamental position, a transformation which finds expression in his *Prolegomena zur christlichen Dogmatik.*

Barth confessedly started from what Kierkegaard calls 'the limitless distinction between time and eternity.' To Barth 'time is the negation of eternity, and eternity the negation of time.' As God dwells in eternity and man dwells in time, the gulf between God and man is unbridgeable. God is essentially Hidden, Distant, Unapproachable. From what Barth calls *die permanente Krisis von Zeit und Ewigkeit* proceeds a radical separation between God and man. But it does not follow that between time and eternity there is a complete absence of relationship. To Barth the conception of time necessarily involves the conception of eternity, as the relative necessarily involves the absolute. 'In the limitation of our existence, in its nullity and transitoriness, in the relativity of all appearance—just in this we recognise eternity as the final fundamental reality.' As obverse corresponds to reverse so the riches of God correspond to the poverty of man. Thus two elements go to the formation of Barth's system, first the radical dualism between time and eternity, man and God, and second, the conception of a positive divine eternity, the positive reality to which the negative existence of man is relative. His 'dialectic' consists in the retention of these two elements side by side without allowing either to detract from the other.

In the Nay we have the Yea, in the question the answer. This relationship between time and eternity, man and God, can only find religious expression as 'tension.' Man may not pass beyond hope. Hope, and nothing more than hope, is the expression of the transcendental relationship between man and God, time and eternity. It is at this point that Hoffmann comes to grips with Barth. If the Christian hope be a living hope, it will include something much more positive than the tension of waiting. An essential part of the Christian hope is a confident assurance of the fulfilment of God's purpose, an assurance which is real here and now. But to Barth the divine consummation lies on the other side of a line which man may not pass even in thought. It belongs to eternity. It is on 'the other bank on which we never may set foot.' Man may not advance beyond a groaning after sonship, a waiting for sonship. Hope is thus reduced to longing, an inadequate anaemic substitute for the real thing. The Barthian dialectic drains religion of its life-blood. The most that Barth can say is that in the Nay we have the Yea. Hoffmann replies that 'the Christian hope utters a round full Yea which stands independently by the side of the Nay.' It even now possesses a foretaste of the final consummation.

Hoffmann also urges against the Barthian system that it is inconsistent with the Biblical doctrine that God enters into time and deals with men on the plane of history. It empties history of any theological significance. 'My history and the history of the human race might be written more honestly and faithfully from the standpoint of the belly than from that of the head,' says Barth. In fact Barth's dialectic tears asunder man and God, time and eternity, so roughly that it leaves no possibility of any relationship except a transcendental relationship. This over-emphasis on divine transcendence is fatal to religion. Revelation itself becomes an impossibility.

So Barth has in recent years been driven to modify his position. The process of modification has been going on ever since the publication of the second edition of his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. It has crystallised in the *Prolegomena zur christlichen Dogmatik.* Barth has not

completely abandoned his original position. He still insists on 'the qualitative and so limitless difference between God and man' and its counterpart, the '*finitum non capax infiniti,*' but the distinction between God and man is no longer envisaged as an abstract dialectic relationship between time and eternity. Barth is now primarily concerned with the problem of revelation, and he is dealing with it concretely. God quite definitely enters into the sphere of human existence. 'At the centre of Barthian thought God no longer stands as the Eternally Unapproachable, the Hidden God, but as *Deus Revelatus.*' Barth frankly states the equation *Deus* = *Deus loquens.* The transformation in Barth's system of thought is fundamental. God reveals Himself in history. He meets man within time as *Thou.* It is inconceivable that Barth could in his earlier writings have said what he now says: 'History is Revelation.' Moreover, he now conceives of an actual undialectic entry of eternity into time. The insoluble parallelism or polarity between time and eternity inherent to his dialectic system has simply disappeared. Hoffmann still deplores the intrusion into Barth's theology of 'a barren scholasticism,' but it is to the good of theology and certainly to the advantage of religion that a thinker who wields a very considerable influence in the religious world should be in process of abandoning the harshness of a dualism which, pressed to its logical conclusion, must ultimately be destructive of any real atonement between man and God.

G.L.H.H.

SHAKESPEARE'S RELIGION.*

A proper understanding of the religious conditions of Elizabethan England will shed much light upon some of our most pressing ecclesiastical problems by reminding us of the origin and particular genius of the Church of England. The Elizabethan Church contained elements of the old Catholicism, of the new Protestantism, and also, most characteristically, of the Renaissance; and the balancing of these sometimes hostile forces is usually recognised to have been due to something in the English epople as well as to the almost preternatural good sense of Elizabeth.

But the greatest figure of Elizabethan England, Shakespeare, is usually considered quite out of relation to the religious conditions of his time. He is usually represented as a man of no religious convictions — a sort of Renaissance sceptic with a sentimental preference for the old ways, the type of man who believes anything because he really believes nothing. Even Shakespearean specialists do not take much trouble to correct this impression.

Mr. Fripp's collection of essays would not at first sight appear to be very closely associated with Shakespeare's religious outlook, but some of them deal intimately with the religious environment in which he grew up (*e.g.* No. 5, 'Th Minister who Baptised Shakespeare, and No. 16, 'Alderman Shakespeare's Religion,' *i.e.* the poet's father), while others deal with Shakespeare's own philosophy of life, as revealed in certain of the plays (*e.g.* the two admirable essays on Falstaff and Monsieur Jaques).

Stratford would seem to have been a predominantly Protestant neighbourhood, and the poet's father, who was not the impecunious and broken tradesman we are accustomed to read of in the biographies, was heavily fined for recusancy, though convictions against recusants were very difficult to secure in theShakespeare country; witnesses could hardly be procured. And, strange as it may seem, there is not a little of the father's Puritanism in the son. In his very interesting study of Falstaff, Mr. Fripp

* *Shakespeare Studies.* By Edgar I. Fripp. (Oxford University Press. 7/6.)

shows that Shakespeare is not enthralled by his own creation, and he joins issue with Dr. Bradley on this point. That great authority has declared of Falstaff that 'for all his addiction to sack, you never see him for an instant with a brain dulled by it, or a temper turned solemn, silly, quarrelsome or pious.' 'But this,' says Mr. Fripp, 'is precisely what we *do* see, and not only once, but again and again. . . . He suffers from reaction after revelling, from qualms of conscience and fear of death. He says silly things, makes jokes that are entirely out of place, contradicts himself almost childishly, and has to acknowledge that he has been made an ass of by women and children and a Welsh parson. "Have I laid my brain," he asks, "in the sun and dried it? 'Tis time I were choked by a piece of toasted cheese."' It is interesting, too, that 'no character in Shakespeare knows his Bible better,' his speeches are strewn with biblical phrases and images and allusions, both to Scripture and to the doctrines upon which contemporary Protestantism laid stress. There is in short not a little of the morality play about the Falstaff scenes.

But the finest piece of criticism in this book is Mr. Fripp's essay on Jaques. This cynical would-be humorist is the typical Renaissance sceptic and immortalist that Shakespeare himself is sometimes represented to be, but which the poet evidently loathed, and he is used 'as a foil to all the brave, wise, delightful personages of the drama.' The great contrast to Jaques is Adam; the cynic at his best and most brilliant 'is answered with great dramatic force (if well acted with a Shakespeare in it) with simple appeal to the eye by a character almost silent, almost incapable of speech.' That burlesque of Petronius' *Septem Aetates* is hardly out of Jaques' mouth when 'Enter Orlando with Adam on his back.' *Juvenis* brings in *Decrepitus*. They are welcomed by *Senex* (Duke Senior), who says to Orlando:

> 'Welcome. Set down your *venerable* burden,
> And let him *feed*.'

'*Venerable* is the language of religion, as always in Shakespeare when deeply moved,' is Mr. Fripp's comment. Then *Virilis* (Amiens) sings his song with its religious thought of 'man's ingratitude' and 'benefits forgot' (the real cause of cynicism). The moving appeal of this sweetest of songs in this most dramatic of settings is usually completely lost upon the English stage. Jaques, like a sort of condescending Archdeacon at a boy-scout camp, sprawls in the centre of the boards, as if the song were sung out of compliment to *him!* In reality the song flattens him out, and is so intended. Adam, not Jaques, is the hero of that central scene of the play; but for most stage managers the old man is a sort of rather ridiculous 'super.' Do such ever ask why it was that Shakespeare took this part himself?

We wish that Mr. Fripp would place us all under a heavy obligation and write a book upon the Elizabethan Church. He is as able to do it as any living scholar and, we suspect, better able. The thing needs doing badly. In days when many of our influential Churchmen are completely ignorant of the true genius of the English Church, it would be no bad thing to have a volume of this sort upon the market to instruct them in the character and quality of their great heritage.

It might be done in reasonable compass and in popular style, even though the book were well documented. Our ecclesiastical Calibans do not like books to be too thick. Will not Mr. Fripp take pity on our state and help to educate us? He could do it so well from the side of the man of letters.

J. C. HARDWICK.

PSYCHICAL RESEARCH.*

Miss Dallas is a well-known student in the field of psychical research, and she puts us all under an obligation by giving an admirable *résumé* here of the principal evidence in which students like herself have become convinced of the certainty of personal survival of death, through actual demonstration.

The evidence, for the most part, is not new, but it is not easily available, and a generation has now grown up which is probably for the most part unfamiliar with the cross-correspondences which were sufficiently remarkable to win over many eminent men to a belief that they emanated from the personality of the deceased F. W. Myers.

Miss Dallas gives us these in some detail, and those who read them when they were originally published will be glad to read them again. They do, in my judgment, appear to justify a belief that the personality of Mr. Myers, or some part of the personality, had survived death, and was able, with great difficulty and in spite of considerable obstacles, to make his continued existence known, and to show that his remarkable knowledge of literature still persisted.

It is very easy to understand how very sincere searchers in this field are put off and disgusted by the miserable and inconclusive futilities which they gather from even well-known mediums. I can imagine nothing more unconvincing than a visit to some even of the best-known mediums. Yet there remain some incidents which are so remarkable and so well attested that no other theory except that of the survival of the person from whom the message purports to come seems to hold the field. One of them is recorded in Vol. II of Henry James' Letters. 'I have had,' says Mr. James, 'through a medium in America, near Boston, a message purporting to come from my mother, who died twenty-five years ago and from whom it ostensibly proceeded during a séance at which my sister-in-law, with two or three other persons, was present. The point is that the message is an allusion to a matter known (so personal is it to myself) to no other individual in the world but me—not possible either to the medium or to my sister-in-law, and an allusion so pertinent and initiated and tender and helpful, and yet so unhelped by any actual earthly knowledge on anyone's part that it quite astounds as well as deeply touches me. If the subject of the message had been conceivably in my sister-in-law's mind it would have been an interesting, but not infrequent, case of telepathy, but, as I say, it couldn't thinkably have been, and she only transmits it to me after the fact, not even fully understanding it. So, I repeat, I am astounded.'

I have myself known a woman, whose judgment I should unhesitatingly trust, who received through automatic writing a message from a man who had died some time ago and whom she had never heard of, addressed to a woman alive, whom also she had never heard of, a message which proved to be genuine, sensible and important. When my friend doubted whether this could be a genuine message from the other world, she received a message written in five languages, none of which, to the best of her belief, she had ever known, and the message was declared by authorities of the British Museum to be correctly worded in all respects.

Some of the evidence in modern times is certainly more cogent and reliable than that on which we accept belief in the physical survival of Our Lord, and it is curious to notice how many clergy urge denial of the

* *Comrades on the Homeward Way.* By H. A. Dallas, Hon. Associate of the Society for Psychical Research. (Collins. 21/- net.)

one set of facts on the same identical grounds on which they urge acceptance of the other.

Miss Dallas' book is well worth reading and will put the facts before those who are interested in a clear and fair way, though the author gives us no idea of the great quantity of failures and futilities which have to be taken into account.

In another edition an index would be of great use, and misprints in the Latin sentence of p. 98 and in the spelling of Plotinus (p. 112) could be corrected.

H.A.

THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE OF A MODERNIST.*

There are many books written to-day dealing with religious experience. For the most part they are descriptions of the religious experience of those who lived in the past re-written by those living in the present. They are, in short, books *about* religious experience, rather than books *of* religious experience. *The Starting Place of Prayer* is a book of religious experience written by a woman living in the modern world and so possessed of modern ways of thinking and feeling: she is neither an ascetic nor a pietist: a married woman with all the interests and duties of a modern household. Though not an ascetic nor a pietist, she is a mystic—if to be a mystic is to realise the need for God and the strength and joy of His presence in the experiences of everyday life. In the course of her experience she passed from Fundamentalism into Modernism. It seems with her to have been a steady evolution.

Our notice of this book is brief, but that is not because we regard it as unimportant. On the contrary, it seems to us to have great value. It is sincere and it moves on the plane of our everyday experience. We wish to commend it to those who have a mind to seek God or who desire to help others to do so.

H.D.A.M.

MATTERS THAT MATTER.†

Dame Henrietta Barnett wrote not a little of her own life when she wrote what is perhaps the most interesting, as it is the most inspiring, of clerical biographies, *Canon Barnett: His Life, Work, and Friends.* In her latest volume compiled by Mrs. Lang (not 'the fellow-elect' of the Primate, but the author of *British Women in the Twentieth Century*), we have an excellent selection from her addresses and papers. They deal with subjects of living, practical interest, *e.g.* University Settlements, America, Housing, Poor Law, Children, Education, Women Preaching, the use of Art, Holidays, Moral Obligations. Wide experience, great shrewdness, kindness of heart, vigorous utterances, deep religious and moral feeling, and a delightful and lovable naturalness characterize these contributions. They are like good conversation. Every page contains something to attract attention. There is one on the value of singing by children as a means of social reform. Béranger, if we recollect rightly, said: 'Let me write the people's songs, I care not who makes their laws.' But it is not only the

* *The Starting Place of Prayer.* By N. C. Sherwood. (Pub. Heffers, Cambridge: 1929. Price 3/-.)

† *Matters that Matter.* By Dame Henrietta Barnett, D.B.E. (Pub. John Murray, 1930. Price 7/6.)

writing of the words of the songs, or the composing of their music, but, as Dame Henrietta points out, the teaching of the children of the nation to sing them in school and street and home which possesses real reformative value. Her aphorisms or *obiter dicta* are many. 'The cleavage between the clerical and the lay mind becomes more pronounced as education spreads.' 'No one can do anything well without effort.' 'Freedom is essential to growth.' 'Well, I can't blame him. If I lived in such conditions I should do the same!' On this Dame Henrietta comments: 'But two black sheep do not make one white one, and we injure our neighbour when we accept for him a low standard.' 'It is not easy to teach children their right relations to animals.' 'There are various objects in toys. One is to give the children pleasure; another to develop character; a third to keep them quiet; and a fourth to enable the family to play together.' 'Christmas is a difficult time. First, the children assume that Christmas is made for them.' We conclude this brief notice with a story of the Prince of Wales. The Prince had completed his tour of the various types of house in the Garden Suburb. Dame Henrietta said to him, 'I do not suppose, Sir, in all your life you have ever seen so many sculleries as you have seen this morning.' 'No,' replied the Prince, 'that is true, but they have taught me a lot.'

H.D.A.M.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE MODERNISM OF MR. HILAIRE BELLOC.

To the Editor of The Modern Churchman.

Sir,

I have only just had brought to my notice a short passage in your review (the number for last May) in which the writer refers to me as a Modernist. I have no desire to interfere in the quarrels between the various Protestant sects, but lest the word 'Modernist' should be misunderstood I beg you to allow me a word on my own behalf.

I have myself defined a Modernist as a man who has lost the Faith but wants to continue to enjoy its advantages. But that, of course, is only an epigram; for the definition of the word Modernist, in the technical theological sense, you must turn to the only authority which has power on earth to settle such things, and you will find it nicely set out by His Holiness Pope Pius X of blessed memory.

I am sure you will not accept the word Modernist in either of these senses, for you do not accept the authority of the Pope, any more than the Anglo-Catholics, Mormons, 7th Monarchy Men, or any other of those who derive from the so-called Reformation. Of course, you won't accept my little epigram, because it is not a true definition, but only an epigram, though I confess myself well pleased with it. What, then, do you exactly mean by calling me a Modernist? If you mean that I have ridiculed the basing of men's faith on the Jacobean translation of the Bible (as, for instance, my doubts that Jonah was swallowed up on the Levantine coast by a Right Greenland whale) you are as right as the whale himself. I don't think he was. If you mean that I deny the infallible authority of the Catholic Church, that is, of the body in communion with the See of Peter and its present occupant, the Vicar of Christ on earth, someone has been misinforming you. Whatever that authority defines I accept.

What, then, exact do you mean? I have been called many things in my life, but I have not yet been called a Modernist! But many things happen before the tomb. Now do please tell me what you mean, for if we can get it down in black and white I think I can analyse the error.

Very faithfully yours,

Kings Land, Shipley, Horsham. H. BELLOC.
July 1st, 1930.

[Mr. Belloc will, we hope, condone our calling him a Modernist in our editorial by reflecting that we did not call him a Semite. We are glad to add his definition of Modernism to many which we have collected. In that collection we have the one by Pope Pius X :—

'Modernism is the compendium and poisonous essence of all heresies.'

We certainly did not apply the term to Mr. Belloc as defined by the Peasant Pope, but in the sense of Father George Tyrrell's definition :

'By a Modernist I mean a churchman of any sort who believes in the possibility of a synthesis between the essential truth of his religion and the essential truth of modernity.'

In his recent book, *Survivals and New Arrivals*, published in 1929, in the section 'The Biblical Attack' (pp. 56-71), Mr. Belloc fiercely attacks Bibliolatry. Who but a Modernist would attack Bibliolatry? From whose vocabulary did he pick that term? In his attack on Bibliolatry he points out very truly that its decline is 'due to the advancement of learning' (p. 63). The strength of Bibliolatry was Literalism, and on the futile Literalist Mr. Belloc heaps ridicule and contempt :

'The Literalist believed that Jonah was swallowed by a right Greenland whale, and that our first parents lived a precisely calculable number of years ago, and in Mesopotamia. He believed that Noah collected in the ark all the very numerous divisions of the beetle tribe. He believed, because the Hebrew word JOM was printed in his Koran 'day,' that therefore the phases of creation were exactly six in number and each exactly twenty-four hours. He believed that man began as a bit of mud handled, fashioned with fingers and then blown upon' (p. 64).

Then he adds :

'Bibliolatry would seem to be nowadays a quaint chapter which the generality of educated men regard as unworthy of mention, at any rate, of so little account that it might be neglected by anyone dealing with the major problems of religion in our moment' (p. 66).

'Bibliolatry has been destroyed by extended geological and historical knowledge' (p. 70).

Mr. Belloc condemns those who in the name of religion opposed the scientific dotrines o cfevolution and the antiquity of man. He jeers at 'The Conflict of Science with Religion,' and finely asks : 'But with what religion can Science conflict save Bibliolatry?' (p. 71).

If this be not Modernism in the department of Biblical study, we should like to know what it is. We may be told that it is truth and good sense, but that does not prevent it being Modernism.

'That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet.'

But when Mr. Belloc would maintain that this is traditional Catholic

orthadoxy, and that it has been recognised as such by the Popes, Doctors and Saints of Latin Christendom, he is presuming on the ignorance of his readers or exposing his own.

Mr. Arnold Lunn wrote of Mr. Belloc's *tour de force* quite correctly in the April number of *The Review of the Churches* (p. 254):

'A view of the scriptures which Mr. Belloc would unhesitatingly condemn as Bibliolatry and Literalism if it had been expressed by a Protestant is embodied in Leo XIII's Encyclical on the study of scripture, in which the following passage occurs:

> 'It is absolutely wrong either to limit inspiration to certain portions only of the Bible, or to concede that the sacred authors themselves have erred . . . indeed so far is it from being possible that an error can co-exist with Inspiration that, on the contrary, Inspiration is not only essentially incompatible with error, but excludes and rejects it as absolutely and necessarily as it is impossible that God Himself, the Supreme Truth, can utter that which is not true . . . For by His supernatural power the Holy Spirit so moved and impelled them to write, was so present with them, whilst they wrote, that all that He bade them write and that only, they first of all rightly understood, then willed faithfully to write down, and finally expressed in fitting words and with infallible truth. Otherwise, it could not be said that the Holy Spirit was the Author of the whole of Holy Scripture.'

And Mr. Arnold Lunn adds:

'Contrast this passage with the passage already quoted in which Mr. Belloc expressed patent dislike of the Jewish scriptures. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that Mr. Belloc would have been burnt with equal pleasure by Torquemada or by Calvin.' ED., *M.C.*]

DAYTON, OHIO.

SIR,

For the sake of accuracy and to save the good name of one of Ohio's great cities, as well as to remove any doubt as to the character of the State of Ohio itself, I beg to call your attention to an error in geography in the May issue of your magazine

On page 59, under the caption 'The Advance of Modernism in the Roman Church,' included in the general topic 'Signs of the Times,' we read as follows:—

> 'Fundamentalism belongs to the past; bibliolatrous literalism lies dying, not simply in Dayton, Ohio, but in the seminaries of Latin Christendom . . .'

It may not be a very serious thing for the great city of Dayton, *Ohio,* to be confused with the town of Dayton, *Tenn.,* and yet I feel moved to ask that the error be corrected. It is very doubtful, if not impossible, that such a trial for intellectual and religious heresy as was held in Dayton, Tenn., could be enacted in Dayton, *Ohio,* or any other city of this great State. Ohio may not be entirely free of bigotry and fundamentalism, or from political corruption; but in my humble judgment it is in many ways a *liberal oasis* in an otherwise conservative Middle West. In spite of many evidences to the contrary, Ohio enjoys a spirit of liberalism and modernism which is finding its way into every department of human affiairs, and, while we hold no brief against Tenn., we like to think that 'Monkey Trials' just simply couldn't be held in Ohio.

Please do not consider this 'ballyhoo' for Ohio; it is simply an effort to clear up a mistake which was made in a magazine in which I take great pride and satisfaction, the *Modern Churchman,* because it tries always to tell the truth. Faithfully yours,

B. DONALDSON.

St. Alban's of Bexley, Bexley, Ohio.
June 25th, 1930.

[We offer profound apologies for our blunder. There is an Irish saying: 'A slip of the tongue is no fault of the mind.' We were conscious of the almost infinite distinction between the two Daytons. It was branded on our brain by the phrase of an American friend who said: 'When I say Dayton, I mean Dayton in Ohio, not that dunghill in Tennessee.' How we came to make such a *lapsus calami* after that experience is a problem that only a highly-trained psychologist can solve. In any case we regret it and apologise.—ED., *M.C.*]

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.

SIR,

In the *Modern Churchman* for March last Mr. G. A. Byron attempts what appears to me to be the impossible task of reconciling the existence of evil with that of an omnipotent, all wise and all loving God. The solution offered is based on the assumption that the eternal welfare of the soul requires that it should have experience of evil. Since God desires the welfare of the soul, it was necessary for him to create evil conditions in order that man might obtain that necessary experience.

But if God were really omnipotent, need He have made the eternal welfare of the soul dependent upon its coming in contact with evil? Is not this assumption itself a denial of God's omnipotence? It certainly appears to me to be so.

My own view is that the existence of evil renders a belief in a God who is at the same time omnipotent and good logically impossible. If He is really omnipotent He cannot be really good. If He is really good He cannot be omnipotent. My personal belief is that God is good. I therefore cannot believe that He is omnipotent. I do not believe that God is responsible for evil. I am quite sure He does everything in His power to counteract it.

I think Our Lord Himself took the same view. In this opinion I am supported by the reviewer of Mr. Fisher's book on Christian Science (*Modern Churchman,* p. 715). Speaking of Our Lord, he says: 'In conjunction with this recognition of the power of faith was combined the conviction that sickness *was not inflicted by the Divine Will.*'

Prof. Eddington's views, which are, as I think rightly, claimed by Mr. Geoffrey Allen (in the same number of the *Modern Churchman*) to be favourable to a theistic interpretation of the universe, do not give any support to the theory that God is omnipotent. Prof. Eddington tells us that the theory of determinism has broken down. As I understand his argument, there is an element of indeterminism in the internal mechanism of the atom, and therefore this mechanism may conceivably be influenced and in part controlled by mind or spirit. The power to shape the course of events in the universe which, according to this theory, we may attribute to the world of spirit is tremendous, but it is not infinitely great, and we may well believe that it is not sufficiently great to permit the exisence of evil to be eliminated from the universe.

To me it appears that if Prof. Eddington's views come to be generally accepted, they must profoundly modify our ideas about the world of Spirit and the nature of God.

G. A. WALKER.

Yungaharra, North Queensland.
May 10th, 1930.

CONCESSIONS TO MODERNISM IN THE DEPOSITED BOOK.

SIR,

In the June number of the *Modern Churchman* (on p. 116) you write :—

'The concessions made to Modernism in the Revised Prayer Book, etc.,' prompts the question : What concessions have been made to Modernism? My answer would be :—

(1) The optional use of the *Quicunque vult.*

(2) The substitution of our Lord's words for the commandments, or the recitation of the commandments in a shortened form. In either case the minister is relieved from the duty of reciting the 4th Commandment in the *Exodus* form.

(3) The substitution of a new proper preface in H.C. for that given in the old book.

The minister is thus not required to state that at Pentecost men received the gift of speaking in foreign languages.

(4) The omission of a few psalms from the list of proper psalms. A sound principle is adopted, but it is not carried far enough. Why appoint Ps. xviii for a Sunday morning, and why fail to take account of the omission of certain verses recommended in No. 508, p. 2?

The new lectionary may be preferable to the old, but it seems to me distinctly disappointing.

(5) In 'The Ordering of Deacons' the new form of question substituted for that given in the old prayer book ('Do you unfeignedly believe all the canonical Scriptures. . . ?) is much to be preferred.

I cannot find any other concessions to modernism. If you can, please point them out.

R.F.B.

[We pointed out in an editorial (Vol. XVI, No. 12, pp. 661-670, March, 1927) sixteen Modernist gains in 'the Composite Book.' We were plainly taking as charitable and optimistic a view of it as we could. We venture to publish the list again in abbreviated form, and to remark that had the revisers spent as much thought in bringing the Prayer Book into harmony with modern needs as in trying to gratify the Anglo-Catholics without giving deep offence to the Evangelicals, we might have obtained much more for the twenty years of liturgical toil than we have received.

(1) We have an improved Lectionary—the Table of Lessons of 1922 as revised in 1927.

(2) A better liturgical arrangement of the Psalter, with permission to omit a number of objectionable verses.

(3) The optional shortening of Morning Prayer and Evening Prayer when followed immediately by another service.

(4) Alternative services of Morning Prayer and Evening Prayer are provided. These possess several advantages. (*a*) An increase in the selection of prefatory sentences arranged according to the Church's seasons. (*b*) An abbreviated form of Exhortation, Confession and

Absolution. (*c*) The *Venite* stops happily with 'the sheep of his hand.' (*d*) Psalm li (rightly omitting the last verse) may be sung instead of the *Benedicite*. (*e*) After the anthem, the minister is given a wider choice in the selection of prayers, including permission to use extempore prayer.

(5) The Apostles' Creed may be substituted for the *Quicunque vult*. If the *Quicunque vult* is used a revised translation is provided.

(6) The Litany may be abbreviated at the discretion of the Minister, and when the Communion Service follows, the prayers at the end of the Litany may be omitted.

(7) A large and valuable supplement is made to the Occasional Prayers and Thanksgivings.

(8) The Feast of the Circumcision is recognized as New Year's Day by a second collect, and an alternative is provided to the third Good Friday Collect.

(9) An alternative Order for the Administration of Holy Communion has been provided. The features which Modern Churchmen will value in it are : (*a*) The Shortened Decalogue. Also permission is given to use our Lord's summary on at least three Sundays in the month. (*b*) The restoration to the laity of the privilege of reading the Epistle. (*c*) An alternative shortened form of Invitation, Confession and Absolution for all occasions except Sundays. (*d*) The insistence (by an altered arrangement) on the use of the First Post-Communion Thanksgiving and also the Second. (*e*) The permission to use shorter forms in administering the Elements. (*f*) The insertion of a new Whit-Sunday Preface which eliminates the reference to the Gift of Tongues and its identification with the power to speak foreign languages by inspiration.

(10) A greatly improved Service for the Public Baptism of Infants.

(11) A most beautiful form of Dismissal added to the Confirmation Service.

(12) A much improved Marriage Service.

(13) There are many alterations and some improvements in the seldom-used Service for the Visitation of the Sick.

(14) In the Burial Service shorter alternative Lessons are provided. The prayers for the departed and the mourners are a desirable addition. The Service for the Burial of a Child will be valued.

(15) The Commination Service is exonerated from the charge that on Ash Wednesday morning we go to church to curse our neighbours.

(16) The Ordination of Deacons substitutes for 'Do you unfeignedly believe all the Canonical Scriptures?' 'Do you unfeignedly believe all the Canonical Scriptures of the Old and the New Testament, as given of God to convey to us in many parts and in divers manners the revelation of Himself which is fulfilled in our Lord Jesus Christ?'

ED., *M.C.*

IN MEMORIAM.

We regret greatly to record the death on July 7th, after a short illness, of the Reverend George Victor Warry Sibley, M.A., A.K.C., Vicar of Old St. Pancras Church, London. Mr. Sibley was a member of the Council of the Modern Churchmen's Union and Chairman of the London Branch. He was much beloved for his kind, modest, practical, self-sacrificing character.